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Abstract 
Economic theories are increasingly popular in political science, and in particular in research on the 
relations between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of government. Among these 
theories, principal-agent (´PA´) and transaction cost economics (´TCE´) feature particularly high in 
our research agenda. Yet, pushed by the view that “the content of ´science´ is primarily the methods 
and rules” (King et al. 1994: 9), and working with limited resources, political scientists have tended to 
neglect careful theorizing. PA and TCE are taken off-the-shelf without much prior scrutiny, and past 
conceptual mistakes are perpetuated. This paper aims at introducing and explaining the real PA, 
positive agency, TCE, and incomplete contracts theories for the purposes of political analysis. In a 
companion paper, I show the serious mistakes perpetuated by political scientists, and I argue that, 
faced with a choice between those four economic theories, we should place our bets on a revised 
version of TCE.   
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INTRODUCTION
* 
Many political scientists are interested in inter-branch relations. I define inter-branch relations as the 
delegation, discretion, and control relations between the legislative and the executive branches of 
government. (This definition can be easily expanded to include the judiciary.) In that context, political 
scientists investigate the causes and consequences of delegation. Answers are sought by examining 
different empirical settings (such as the delegation of powers from the legislature to the executive 
branch of government within a state, or the delegation of powers from member states of an 
international organisation to the institutions of that organisation). Past failures to build an adequate 
theory of delegation and control have led political scientists to turn for inspiration to economic 
theories.  
Ever since the mid-1980s, increasing numbers of political scientists attempt to explain delegation 
and control by referring to the economic theories of principal-agent and/or transaction cost economics. 
Within the more limited field of European studies (broadly defined), these theories have been used by, 
inter alias, Ballmann, Epstein & O´Halloran 2002, Bergman 2000, Blom-Hansen 2005, De Bièvre and 
Dür 2004, Doleys 2000, Egan 1998, Franchino 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2004, 2007, Garrett 1992, Garrett 
and Weingast 1993, Gilardi 2001, Jun 2003, Kassim and Menon 2003, Lane 2002, Lane and Ersson 
2003, Majone 1996a, 1996b, 1997b, 2001, Pierson 1996, Pollack 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 
Rasmussen 2005, Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998, Strøm 2000, Tallberg 2000, 2002, Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2002, and Tsebelis and Garrett 2001.  
Beyond European studies, courses and workshops on the relationship between these or similar 
research questions and these economic theories abound (e.g. RIAS, Harvard University, December 
2002; WCIA, Harvard University, April 2003; APSA Conference, Philadelphia, August 2003; U.C. 
San Diego, September 2003; Birkbeck College, London, March 2004; European University Institute, 
Florence, May 2006; Duke University, March 2006). Americanist studies that refer to these theories 
run into the hundreds (Epstein & O´Halloran 1999: 28; Huber and Shipan 2006). 
It may therefore be surprising to find that, as such, these economic theories do not say much about 
delegation and control. Three points need to be stressed from the outset. 
•  First, neither transaction cost economics (‘TCE’) nor principal-agent (‘PA’) theories can 
automatically generate hypotheses regarding the delegation of powers by politicians to a policy-
making bureau. TCE can be adapted to examine whether a bureau will be integrated into the 
political system or not, but not whether there should be any delegation at all.
1 Similarly, PA 
theory can be used to characterise the set of feasible allocations of resources between politicians 
and the bureau given the participation, incentive compatibility, and coalition incentive 
compatibility constraints of bureaucrats – but not to determine whether politicians should rely on 
an in-house or an external bureau.  
•  Second, PA theories do not generate hypotheses regarding the possibility of ex post shirking or 
drifting by the supposed agent. PA theories can be used to describe how the principal should 
optimise the contract he offers to the agent (i.e. the allocation of resources), but they do not 
                                                      
*   I acknowledge the financial support of the European Commission under its Marie Curie Fellowships Programme, the 
hospitality of the Centre for Regulatory Governance, University of Exeter, and the Department of Political and Social 
Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. I thank Adrienne Héritier for her help on political-scientific points, Elia Marzal for 
her help on legal points, and Pascal Courty and Oliver Williamson for their help on specific economic points. Two 
anonymous referees provided extensive and useful comments, some of which go beyond my sphere of (in-)competence. 
Any remaining errors are entirely my own. 
1    As will become apparent below, integration and delegation are different concepts, not different values of the same 
concept. For example, delegation occurs both in integrated and in non-integrated settings – unlike integration or non-
integration, it is ‘inevitable’ (Huber and Shipan 2006: 256; see also McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987: 243). Yannis Karagiannis 
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focus on ex post elements that the principal cannot take into account ex ante. Referring to ex 
post maladaptations in the context of a PA analysis is abusive and misleading. (On the other 
hand, such ex post issues are captured by TCE.) 
•  And third, these two theories (PA and TCE) are neither the same nor complementary: they are 
based on radically different assumptions. One of these concerns the cognitive abilities of actors, 
and hence their resources. Where PA rests on the ‘classical’ behavioural assumption of perfect 
rationality, TCE rests on semi-strongly bounded rationality (Williamson 1996: 8-9). This, and 
other, different assumptions have far-reaching implications, which have often been overlooked 
in the literature. 
Documentation of these claims is the topic of the present paper.  
Thus, the theoretical foundations of the hypotheses advanced in the political-scientific literature, 
including the literature on the EU, are either ambiguous (where they are based on implicit extensions 
of the theories, or when they confuse the positive theory of agency with principal-agent theory) or 
plainly wrong (where they mix these theories, alone or with others, in an ad hoc fashion).
2 One 
primary aim of the present paper is to demonstrate why this is so, and why political-scientific models 
need to more carefully acknowledge the theoretical foundations of their hypotheses. That is, I will 
argue that the process of crudely translating economic theories into political science has come at a 
cost, one that affects both the internal consistency and the logical completeness of these theories.
3 
More specifically, I offer an extensive explication of the development, rationale, and assumptions 
of the theories of PA, positive agency (´PTA´), TCE, and incomplete contracts theory (´ICT´) – that is, 
four economic theories that political scientists have too long crudely lumped together under the 
heading ‘New Economics of Organization’ (Moe 1984). This explication may at times not make easy 
reading.
4 Yet, it is a necessary step aimed at (a) correcting various misunderstandings in the existing 
literature (especially in political science, and in Europeanist studies therein); (b) building more 
confidence in our models of inter-branch relations; and (c) clarifying the road for future research in 
these areas.
5  
                                                      
2   I have encountered some difficulty in explaining this point to political scientists who are engaged in policy research and 
who use a ‘principal agent’ perspective. Most of my interlocutors did not perceive the combination of different theories 
as problematic, as long as theories generate falsifiable hypotheses. The first section in this paper is a digression aimed at 
explaining my views on this issue: theories and models have to be logically complete and internally consistent; ad hoc 
introductions of inconsistent hypotheses create both theoretical and methodological problems (e.g. an empirical 
observation cannot anymore be explained by the value of the independent variable, since it may also be explained by the 
underlying assumptions).      
3   Internal consistency is achieved when the statements that compose a theory are mutually consistent. Logical 
completeness is achieved when the hypotheses deduced from a theory follow logically from the assumptions of a theory.  
4   I believe this to be due not only to my own limitations (see the next footnote), but also to the complexity of this field in 
economics. Indeed, many economists do not seem to be themselves aware of all the differences between these theories, 
while the field is progressing very quickly. This is presumably the reason for all the reviewing, categorising and 
classifying work being done recently in this field (e.g. Williamson 1996, 1999; Malin and Martimort 2000; Chiappori and 
Salante 2000; Whinston 2001; Brousseau and Glachant 2002; Laffont and Martimort 2002; Martimort – forthcoming in 
the New Palgrave).    
5   Of course, there are other reasons why I offer this detailed literature review here. They can be understood using a positive 
agency framework. You (the reader) represent for me a ‘societal principal’: you have financed my research (which I do 
not wish to stop in the future) and in return you have asked me to provide you with some knowledge on a specific topic. 
This is our implicit contract. Note, however, that you do not know as much as I know, either in terms of this topic, or in 
terms of the effort I have put in acquiring and producing this knowledge. What you need to do is offer me the right mix of 
incentives and punishments. What I need to do is (a) gain some assurance on your behalf that I will not bear the total risk 
of a potential final failure, thus (b) ensure that you take into account all of my effort, and thus (c) incur some bonding 
costs that allow me to proceed in tranquility. For me, providing you with this literature review is a bonding cost (which I 
can measure in terms of hours spent trying to understand, summarize and present complicated economic ideas and their 
relationship to political scientific works, and in terms of space dedicated to non-competition policy issues, which is my 
empirical field of research). For you, it is an assurance that I am not providing you with a poor-quality product, or with a Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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The starting point needs to be that the four aforementioned economic theories are neither identical, 
nor strictly linked in any way. References to one that appear in analyses based on the other are not 
only confusing, but, as far as they implicitly introduce different assumptions, plainly erroneous and 
misleading. This specification is necessary because the currently prevailing (confused and confusing) 
view seems to be that at least two of these theories (PA and TCE) are identical, or that one of them is 
only a special case of the other. For example, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987: 247) wrote that 
‘monitoring and enforcement are not costless’, thus hinting to the existence of transaction costs. In the 
next paragraph, however, they added that ‘the problem of bureaucratic compliance has long been 
recognized as a principal-agent problem’, thus mixing principal-agent with transaction costs. 
(Actually, Mcnollgast mixed more than these two theories, and thus more than a couple of inconsistent 
assumptions. They thus perpetuated the ‘original sin’ of Moe 1984.)   
Similarly, Pollack writes of ‘principal-agent models of delegation of powers’ (2003: 5) and 
ascertains that ‘principal-agent models are quite successful in predicting the functions delegated to the 
Commission and the Court of Justice…’ (ibid. 9). Yet, as I will document below, PA theory is not able 
to generate such predictions regarding delegation of powers. In the absence of additional work in view 
of adapting these theories to our research questions, the claim that either PA, or PTA, or TCE, or ICT, 
can generate hypotheses regarding the delegation of powers to a public bureaucracy makes no sense.  
In the same spirit, Epstein and O’Halloran make a long way in elucidating the meaning of TCE 
concepts for political science, and even point to the fact that PA cannot do the job of TCE (1999: 39). 
Yet, perhaps contradicting themselves, they also use PA as a ‘building block’ for their political TC 
theory (ib. 27-9). This contradiction is furthered when they note that ‘just as in economic situations, 
[transactions among political actors] may not take place due to the existence of transaction costs, such 
as … principal-agent losses’ (ib. 44), and ‘the problems of delegation stem mainly from Congress’ 
principal-agent problems of oversight and control, which we describe as a political hold-up problem’ 
(ib. 49). These views are not only contradictory in themselves, but also in stark contradiction with the 
economic literature that they are meant to reflect. For example, Williamson has argued that ‘ex post 
transaction costs are related to, but plainly differ from … agency costs’ (1985: 21; see also 
Williamson 1996: 176; Jensen 1983; Eisenhardt 1989). 
PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT were developed by economists studying the relationship between two 
contracting parties who seek to establish, or who already are, in a collaborative (i.e. risk-sharing) 
relationship.
6 TCE has been used to explain why actors choose to collaborate within a business firm, 
(Contd.)                                                                   
product that already exists in the market. (For the rent-efficiency trade-off that you are now facing, see the main text 
below. In any case, please do not skip this literature review. It is technical, but it bonds us. If you were an airline and I 
were an aircraft producer, would you prefer me copying a competitor’s aircraft and thereby free-riding on his R&D 
investment, or would you rather make sure that I myself understand all the relevant bits of knowledge in jet technology?) 
6   There is a second view, according to which such relationships were first theorised not by economists, but by social and 
political theorists. This historical argument runs as follows: PA theory is a theory of collaboration, or risk-sharing; risk-
sharing is based on implicit or explicit contracts; the theoretical bases for the analysis of such contracts were thrown by 
social theorists, rather than by economists. Exponents of this view therefore argue that the contractarian model of politics 
stems from social theory and political science rather than from economics. For example, Buchanan (1986: 240 ff) traces 
that model to Hobbes’ discussion of individuals who face ‘total war’ and hence contract with the sovereign, thereby 
loosing part of their liberty and (possibly) democratic rights, but gaining order and security. He adds: ‘The Hobbesian 
metaphor suggests … that so long as the sovereign remains within the agreed and assigned limits of the initial 
contract … ‘democratic’ attributes of the sovereign’s decision-making would be out of place and, indeed, would be 
counter-productive.’ Similarly, Immergut (1998) has argued that the rational choice variant of the new institutionalism is 
traceable to Rousseau’s theory of the influence of societal norms and institutions on individuals’ preferences.  
In my understanding, these views are correct, in the sense that they demonstrate the constant preoccupation of political 
thinkers with the costs of using the ‘democracy infrastructure’ or the dangers inherent in cooperative ventures (witness 
Rousseau’s stag hunt game). However, it is also necessary to note that these old political theories were neither the older 
relevant theories in this area (see, for example, Bodin’s Six Livres sur la République, or even Plato’s speculations about 
the education of the Guardians, in the Republic), nor explicitly founded on the same conceptualisation of transaction 
costs as the modern economic theories. Yannis Karagiannis 
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or conversely, why actors who might benefit from such mutual exchange may actually not do so. 
Examples include many ‘non-standard’ business practices, such as vertical integration, or mergers. In 
such situations, the central question asked is: ‘What purposes are served by supplanting classical 
market exchange … by more complex forms of contracting (including nonmarket modes of economic 
organization)?’ (Williamson 1985: 23) In other words, the central question raised by TCE concerns 
the existence and the boundaries of the firm. Hence, TCE aims at explaining different institutional 
outcomes – it is a theory of institutions.  
PA, on the other hand, has been used to analyze the relationship between actors who seek to 
collaborate, and thereby develop a mutually beneficial short- or long-term trading relationship. Such 
actors must therefore define the terms of their collaboration, not only in terms of prices and quantities, 
but also in terms of their respective identities, the effort they put in the production of the goods they 
trade, and the ways in which they communicate. Examples include employers and employees, 
stockholders and chief executives, etc. In such situations, the central question asked is: What is the 
optimal structure of the contract that the principal can propose to the agent, given that the existence of 
an agent imposes a certain number of constraints upon the principal? In other words, the central 
question raised in PA concerns the optimization problem that the principal faces, given certain 
exogenously defined constraints. Hence, PA aims at explaining the effects of different institutions on 
the optimal contract – it is an institutionalist theory, but not a theory of institutions. (Note also that it 
would be wrong to equate PA with any strategic effort to establish co-operation.) 
Having exhausted the two hands (TCE on the one hand, PA on the other), we can turn to one foot: 
PTA. The foot metaphor is useful, because that theory is actually a footnote to PA theory [
7]: it is less 
of a theory and more of a reminding to PA analysts that the real-world is characterized by the ubiquity 
of agency costs (PA theory is a theory of perfect rationality and complete contracts). According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), PTA serves to test two hypotheses: (a) outcome-based compensations are more 
efficient than ex ante lump-sum payments because they limit agency costs; and (b) agency losses 
(defined as firm valuations plus monitoring costs) are proportional to information asymmetries. In 
what follows, I take a more detailed and nuanced view, but I agree with the implication of 
Eisenhardt’s presentation: this theory is not a theory that can adequately address the research questions 
asked by political scientists. Like with PA and TCE, considerable adaptations are needed in order to 
apply this view to political phenomena.  
1. THE ROLE OF THEORY AND CAREFUL THEORISING 
Having mentioned the confusion that characterises political-scientific works that use these theories, a 
trade-off may arise between the goals of (a) substantive knowledge accumulation at the level of 
specific hypotheses (empirical knowledge), and (b) rigor and progress at the level of theories 
(theoretical advancement). Aiming for lower-level empirical knowledge alone means adopting 
existing hypotheses and testing them in a new empirical setting – hopefully a setting that is 
methodologically interesting. However, it also means replicating past theoretical mistakes, and not 
being able to proceed scientifically (e.g. not being able to proceed by describing and solving a game, 
which then generates testable hypotheses). On the other hand, aiming for higher-level theoretical 
advancement means correcting past mistakes, but at the same time rejecting many existing hypotheses 
and insights about the motivations of political actors – and hence loosing sight of the existing literature 
and of currently dominant explanations of institutions. The way that I propose to proceed, then, is by 
delimiting the scope of the economic theories of PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT (this paper), and then 
                                                      
7    I use the word ‘footnote’ in the same way as Alfred Whitehead in his famous dictum that ‘[t]he safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.’ PTA (like 
many other branches of economics), is a footnote to Kenneth Arrow. Obviously, footnote writers can carry names such as 
Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant. (Note also the end of the preceding paragraph in Whitehead’s text: 
‘ultimately nothing rests on authority; the final court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.’)   Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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examining how these theories have been (inaccurately or mistakenly) used in political science 
(accompanying paper).    
The remaining of this section is dedicated to a reminding of (a) the role of theory in political 
science, and in the social sciences in general; and (b) the criteria for the selection of one theory among 
many competing ones. These points are raised here because of two reasons. First, faced with the 
aforementioned problems posed by theoretical inquiries, readers who are interested only in the 
specifics of a certain policy may be tempted by the idea of rejecting theoretical approaches altogether. 
Yet, theoretical difficulties should not discourage scientific inquiry: they do not warrant a return to a-
theoretical, case-specific and non-generalisable knowledge. Second, the market for theoretical ideas in 
political science is far from perfectly competitive. Bottlenecks, sunk costs, increasing returns to scale 
and important transaction costs combine to make the search for the best theory to apply in specific 
empirical researches prohibitively expensive. This has resulted in path-dependent adoptions of the 
same theories, and, by the same token, path-dependent perpetuation and aggravation of the same 
theoretical mistakes.            
It is useful to begin the discussion on causal theories by returning to specific research questions. As 
mentioned above, the ones I have in mind here concern (a) the reasons why legislators delegate policy-
making powers to bureaucrats; and (b) the consequences of such acts of delegation in terms of the 
subsequent relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. These two research questions can be 
asked at higher or lower levels of abstraction and generality. For example, at a lower level of 
abstraction we may be interested in the reasons why Member States delegate powers to the European 
Commission, or in the subsequent effects of such delegation in terms of the politics of the EU. At a 
more general level (but with greater loss of information), we may be interested in the reasons why 
sovereign states delegate powers to international agents, or to the subsequent effects of such 
delegation in terms of the politics of the corresponding international organisation.  
When going from a lower to a higher level of abstraction, specific cases become decreasingly well-
defined, and thus decreasingly differentiated. In other words, when moving towards higher levels of 
abstraction, increasing amounts of information are lost. For this reason, the theory that is chosen to 
answer the research questions needs to be capable of covering many different cases, while at the same 
time being capable of differentiating among such cases. Thus, a theory needs to be both as general as 
possible, and able to sustain hypotheses that are as specific as possible. This point can be illustrated by 
reference to an example, such as my own first research question. This concerns the causes of 
delegation of competition powers in the EU to the European Commission. What is needed is not only a 
theory that can explain delegation generally, but also a theory that can differentiate between the 
specific values taken by ‘delegation’ in this specific context (i.e. delegation by sovereign states to an 
international executive, delegation of one or more functions but not of other functions, delegation to a 
multi-agent organization and not to a single-purpose organization, etc). Conversely, a theory that can 
only explain the value taken by ‘delegation’ in only one specific case (one observation) and not in 
other cases, is a poor theory. Thus, if the first goal is to learn something about the politics of EU 
competition policy (which is itself a more general goal than, say, trying to learn something about the 
decision-making process followed within the Commission is a specific antitrust case), the research 
needs to be firmly based on a specific and explicitly stated theory of more general relevance.  
This problem, I believe, lies at the root of many inaccuracies in the existing literature: driven by the 
desire to refer to theories that are as generally applicable as possible, some analyses have (a) lost the 
ability to explain the specific cases that they investigate, and (b) have mixed many different theories, 
without acknowledging the corresponding mix of different assumptions.   
Yet, theoretically-founded research is always better than a-theoretical research. Indeed, a theory 
serves to (1) focus the research on those elements that are thought to be significant, and eliminate 
those elements that are thought to be less significant; (2) explicate and assess the plausibility of 
assumptions about elements that we do not directly observe; (3) describe the mechanisms that render Yannis Karagiannis 
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the links between different observations plausible; (4) derive testable hypotheses; (5) locate the most 
interesting explanatory factors, and thus enhance comparison; and (6) build an identifiable body of 
cumulative research. In the absence of a theoretical referent (which, to take again an example from my 
own research, is admittedly a very frequent situation in the legal and political literature on EU 
competition policy), an analysis cannot claim anything more than what is directly observed. This 
means that a-theoretical analyses cannot make any truly causal claims, and that their findings cannot 
be generalised to any other case than the one that they describe. In other words, in the absence of a 
theory, even ‘similar’ cases are not similar … unless a theory tells us they are.  Of course, a counter-
argument against explicit theorising could be that similar cases are ‘obviously’ similar. Yet, the 
answer to this counter-argument is that ‘obvious’ depends on theoretical assumptions, and that it is 
always an improvement to make these explicit.    
But, the need for a theory does not answer the question of which theory should be chosen. This 
question is particularly important because, by definition, when choosing a theory we do not yet know 
how well that theory fits with the empirical data. Given that there are several social-scientific theories 
to which one could refer in order to explain political, social, economic and legal issues, choosing the 
best theory would not only involve impossible amounts of theory-comparing work, but it would also 
equate the beginning and the end of research. Additional choice criteria are therefore needed.  
Commonly used criteria for the selection of a theory include (a) fit with the research questions, (b) 
internal consistency, (c) logical completeness, (d) falsifiability, (e) parsimony, (f) plausibility, and (g) 
current development in conceptual accuracy and empirical testing. However, these criteria raise two 
problems. First, their use presupposes an accurate ex ante knowledge of different theories. Such 
knowledge is rarely available to researchers in the real world: it is more usually gained while working 
with a theory, and its acquisition is often perceived by empirical researchers (and disciplines) as 
counter-productive. Second, although a theory is supposed to increase the scientific content and 
method of research, these criteria themselves are not entirely scientific. For example, parsimony, 
plausibility and current development are only partly scientific criteria.  
Whatever the magnitude of these problems, however, they do not justify a rejection of either theory 
in general, or of conscious attempts to justify one’s choice in favour of a particular theory. One way to 
deal with this problem is to be aware of its existence and to clearly state the theoretical assumptions of 
a research, so that subsequent work can determine whether the best choice was indeed made. The 
starting points are therefore that (a) any research is implicitly or explicitly founded on a number of 
assumptions regarding the phenomena that it examines, and (b) making these assumptions explicit is 
better than keeping them implicit.  
According to King, Keohane and Verba, ‘a model is a simplification of, and approximation to, 
some aspect of the world’ (1994: 49). But, again, how should one decide which simplifications and 
approximations are appropriate, and which are not? (We sometimes encounter speakers who, when 
asked about how they chose their theoretical framework, reply with an ‘authority argument’, like: ‘X 
and Y did it, so that is why I do it, too.’ My goal here is to think about ways to go beyond that 
answer … which I have sometimes given myself.) What are the relevant aspects of the political reality 
that models of delegation, agency, and EU policy-making should capture, and what are the irrelevant 
ones that can be excluded? I posit that the appeal of the economic theories of PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT 
consists of their demonstrable qualities of logical completeness, internal consistency, and (perhaps) 
falsifiability. What remains to be seen, is which theory is more relevant for our science of inter-branch 
relations.    
Yet, one of our main scientific motivations must be to find ways to further improve the accuracy of 
existing theories. In Europeanist studies, for example, we already possess a considerable syllabus of 
PA and TCE works – the best of which include (by virtue of either originality or/and sophistication 
or/and publishing success) Franchino 2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2007; Majone 1996a, 1996b, 2001; and 
Pollack 1997, 2002, 2003, 2006. Although these authors have done an invaluable job in renewing the Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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study of the EU by translating Americanist models, they have perpetuated and/or aggravated the 
inaccuracies of the Americanist models, which were themselves translations of economic models into 
political science. One of the main arguments in this paper is this: some important economic insights 
were lost in translation. We should stop just getting ‘inspiration’ from the economic literature – this 
leads us to mixing up different theories that are based on different implicit assumptions. Rather, we 
should try to understand these theories, in all their complexity – including in their differences. In other 
words, if economists had delegated to political scientists the task of applying economic theories to 
political analysis, then political scientists have not fulfilled their contractual obligations to the benefit 
of either discipline.    
Although I believe that economic theories carry a great promise for political-scientific analysis 
(and especially for inter-branch relations), I also concur with Jean Tirole’s argument that the economic 
theories of transaction costs and agency are not readily applicable to political science (Tirole 1986). 
After all, the two disciplines continue to be taught separately, and this is probably due more to the fact 
that the object of their studies somehow differs, than to some kind of market rigidity that does not 
allow them to merge (for the case of TCE, see Karagiannis 2007; for a different view based on a more 
general perspective, see Ordeshook 1990). In addition, several economic concepts, such as ‘markets’, 
‘transactions’, ‘gains from exchange’, ‘efficiency’, ‘hierarchy’, ‘incentives’, etc, need to be translated 
into politically relevant and significant concepts. Thus, in order to use economic theories correctly, we 
need to adapt them to our specific political-scientific objects of inquiry. To put it boldly, if political 
scientists delegate to economists the task of analysing political phenomena using their existing models, 
economists will almost certainly not fulfil their contractual obligations successfully either.
8       
 
2. TRANSACTION COSTS AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT: DIFFERENT ORIGINS, 
DIFFERENT FOCUS, DIFFERENT NATURE. 
In this section I present the different origins of the economic theories of transaction costs (‘TCE’), 
principal-agent (‘PA’), and positive theory of agency (´PTA´). TCE is rooted in the work of Coase 
(1937), while PA and PTA are rooted in the work of Berle and Means (1932). Later, PA theory 
became known as normative principal-agent theory, and generated the theories of contracts, incentives 
and implementation. (The latter does not correspond to implementation studies in policy studies, 
though it could usefully inform it). As the next section shows, these different origins are still relevant, 
in the sense that they still produce important differences, and they still generate heated debates 
between economists. Yet, political scientists have often confused these three theories. They have 
sought to add theoretical rigor to their works, but they have relied only on an intuitive understanding 
of what have become pop-theories. A more correct application can only be based on their thorough 
understanding – including a thorough understanding of their differences and their different origins.        
The origins of TCE [and, more generally, of the new institutional economics (‘NIE’)] can be traced 
back to Roland Coase’s famous 1937 article ‘The Theory of the Firm.’ What troubled Coase in his 
efforts to understand the post-Depression economy was that, whereas mainstream economics assumed 
that competition, acting through a system of prices, would do all the necessary co-ordination to 
stabilise the economy, there actually was a factor of production whose function was to co-ordinate: 
management. The co-ordinating function of management had been unjustifiably neglected by neo-
classical economists who focused exclusively on the (competing) co-ordinating function of the market 
                                                      
8   Yet another way to express the same idea is that political economy is not a bit of politics and a bit of economics, but 
economics and politics. If it were the former, the analyst might be able to pick and choose the doses according to 
convenience. Economics-inclined analysts would be heavier on formalization, and politics-inclined analysts would be 
heavier on law, institutions, and history. Political economy, as I understand it, is best represented by Bates et al. (1998; 
but see Elster 2000) and Boix (2003).  Yannis Karagiannis 
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mechanism. Yet, the existence of management hinted to the fact that it was actually an economising 
devise. It allowed the firm not only to reduce expenses, but, more fundamentally, to exist. In its 
absence, there would be no firms, but just a myriad of inter-personal market exchanges. (We shall see 
below that this is precisely the view of PA, PTA, and ICT.) From these observations, Coase came to 
the following conclusion: ‘The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be 
that there is a cost in using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of organising production 
through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.’ (1937: 390)  
Coase’s famous insight means that using the market is costly, and therefore that economic 
agents who are given the chance to do so will organise production in view of minimising 
market-generated transaction costs (´TCs´). Note in the quotation from Coase that 
‘discovering … relevant prices’ is not the only TC, but just ‘the most obvious.’ Indeed, other 
TCs include negotiating and drafting contracts, executing simultaneously myriads of separate 
but inter-related contracts, monitoring deliveries and quality, settling disputes, paying 
brokers’ commissions, paying taxes and duties, etc. (see also Coase, 1994; 7-8) More 
generally then, TCs fall into five broad categories:  
(a)  search and information costs;  
(b) bargaining costs;  
(c)  costs of executing multiple contracts;  
(d) monitoring and enforcement costs; and  
(e)  public policy incentives to avoid the market.
9   
Obviously then, TCs are not just ubiquitous in the market: they are an inherent characteristic of the 
market. They are ‘the costs of running the economic system’ (Arrow 1970: 48), ‘the economic 
equivalent of friction in physical systems’ (Williamson 1985: 19). (Note that any theory that does not 
acknowledge the presence of such TCs may be doing so either because it relies on relevant empirical 
findings – in which case it may still be a TC theory – or because it excludes TCs by assumption – in 
which case it is not a TC theory.) It follows that, the more market transactions an economic actor 
performs, the more his TCs will increase. Hence, whenever possible, rational profit-maximising actors 
will seek to minimise these costs by avoiding the market, subject only to the constraints created by 
their own managerial resources (Coase’s ‘decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function’). They will 
thus first try to identify all potentially significant TCs, compare these costs of relying on the market 
with the costs of producing themselves the goods they need, and then choose the least costly option. In 
short, if using the market is costly, rational economic actors will not do so if there is a less costly 
alternative. 
That 1937 article raised all the fundamental questions that came to define the research agenda of 
economic theorists working in the fields of transaction costs, the theory of the firm and organizational 
theory – but not, as we shall see, principal-agent models. Three main research questions were posed: 
(1) why does a firm emerge at all in a specialized exchange economy? (i.e. the question of the 
existence of the firm); (2) what are the forces which determine the size of the firm? (i.e. the question 
                                                      
9   Coase also referred to an additional category of TCs, that of protecting trade secrets. When a business (firm X) relies on 
the market, it relies on external, contracted agents (A). By collaborating with A, X reveals to them (some of) its trade 
secrets, i.e. its instruments for obtaining an advantage over its competitors (firms Y, Z). Yet, because A are not hired (i.e. 
they are not part of firm X), they may subsequently be contracted by Y or Z, to whom they may supply these trade 
secrets. X is thus at a disadvantage relatively to Y or Z, which may aim at free riding on the knowledge accumulated by 
X. That disadvantage and the costs of limiting it, are due to the existence of a market. X therefore has an incentive to hire 
A on a permanent basis, and therefore to destroy the market for A.  
Protecting trade secrets is a very interesting source of TCs. Yet, its use in political science is unclear. In many political 
circumstances, an actor may actually wish the others to operate in exactly the same way as he does, rather than the 
opposite. Important exceptions include security policies, party organizations, trade instruments, etc. It might be 
productive to study the extent of such TCs in EU politics.      Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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of the boundaries of the firm); and (3) when do ‘diminishing returns to management’ occur? (i.e. the 
internal organization of the firm). 
Despite its insightfulness, Coase’s theory took a long time to influence mainstream economics 
(Coase 1972). By and large, the competitive market continued to be viewed as a costless exchange 
mechanism that was conducive to maximum efficiency, even if it needed the protection afforded by 
courts. Despite the prominence achieved by Herbert Simon’s concepts of organizational decision-
making under uncertainty, imperfect information, and ‘satisficing’, most economists did not 
acknowledge that exchanges and cooperation could be costly because of the ubiquity of TCs.  
Coase’s first contribution came in 1937. Five years earlier, however, Berle and Means had come to 
a similar (not identical!) conclusion regarding corporate finance (Berle and Means 1932). They had 
argued that the separation in American firms between ownership and control, the empowerment of 
managers compared to the (increasingly diluted) power of shareholders, and the ensuing emergence of 
that powerful new social class (managers of big business) posed several threats for the American 
economy and democracy. First, these factors made the corporate world rely on additional, 
unnecessary, and potentially wasteful exchange relationships; these relationships worked at the 
advantage of managers, who thus became increasingly unaccountable, thus damaging the interests of 
shareholders. Second, they made the American polity rely on a new self-serving and powerful social 
class, which, through its monopolisation motives and potential, posed a big threat to the competitive 
organisation of the economy. And third, they ultimately represented a threat to US democracy, similar 
to that identified by Thomas Jefferson in his industrial policy argument against James Madison. 
(Jefferson had championed a decentralised organisation of the economy along competitive lines with 
small owner-controlled units of production, while Madison had championed the creation of large 
industrial structures.)[
10] 
More specifically, among other claims, Berle and Means argued that the dilution of capital and the 
delegation of powers from (a) shareholders to boards of directors, and (b) boards of directors to 
managers made such exchange relationships work to the benefit of managers’ private interests rather 
than to those of the shareholders. In other words, shareholder dispersion created managerial discretion, 
and managerial discretion worked against the interests of shareholders, the economy and the polity. In 
addition, they specified the causal mechanism producing this effect: under such arrangements, 
shareholders need to spend considerable resources in gathering information about managers’ effort and 
activities, in negotiating managers’ contracts and duties, and in enforcing their views on managers. 
Further, this effect was reinforced by the dilution of ownership in the hands of ever increasing 
numbers of (relatively) small shareholders. This led to unwarranted managerial strategies, to 
inefficient monopolisation, and thus to the dangers identified at the systemic level.  
Just like Coase’s 1937 contribution defined the fields that later came to be known as TCE, the 
theory of the firm, and organizational theory, Berle and Means’ 1932 contribution defined the fields 
that came to be known as PA and PTA. The concept of conflicting incentives was identified and 
defined, and its implications became the main research questions of the resulting body of works. 
Among these, the most fundamental question concerned the optimal structure of the PA contract. 
Intriguingly, just as Coase’s contribution was not integrated into economics for four decades, the 
contribution of Berle and Means took a considerable time to make its impact, too.
11 Even in their own 
                                                      
10  On the normative nature of the debate in 19th century America and in post-World War II sociology, see the absorbing 
account of Mizruchi 2004.  
11 These delays have been identified in the literature (e.g. Coase 1972; Williamson 1996), and evidently point to some 
inefficiency in the functioning of the academy. They could be studied profitably using a PA, PTA, or TCE perspective. If 
(a) society (or research funding bodies) has an implicit (or explicit) contractual relationship with academics; (b) 
academics do not necessarily have the same motivations as the less informed members of society (or of funding bodies); 
and (c) monitoring the output of academics is costly, then academics may be allowed to pursue inefficient strategies. A 
PA perspective should focus on the optimization of academic research contracts from a societal perspective. A PTA Yannis Karagiannis 
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sub-discipline (corporate finance), the dominant view throughout most of the post-war decades was 
that of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). According to Modigliani and Miller’s ‘theory of 
irrelevance’, a firm’s corporate and financial structure made no difference to its total value: the 
separation of ownership and management (i.e. the reliance on an exchange mechanism) did not seem 
to raise any particularly relevant issues, and nor did the choice between equity and different sorts of 
debt. Where Berle and Means had raised the issues of adverse selection, moral hazard and the resulting 
costs associated with correcting these flaws, Modigliani and Miller argued that such issues were 
irrelevant. With hindsight gained from theoretical developments and recurring corporate scandals, it is 
surprising to find that Modigliani’s and Miller’s theory remained dominant until the 1980s.    
Box 1: The original basic differences between Transaction Cost Economics and Normative 
Principal-Agent theory.  
 TRANSACTION  COST 
ECONOMICS 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
Origins  Coase 1937  Berle and Means 1932 
Empirical Focus   Vertical integration of firms  Separation of ownership and control 
Theoretical Focus  Positive analysis of institutions   Normative analysis of contract 
Research questions  When do firms produce to their needs, 
and when do they procure in the 
market? 
What are the organizational and 
public policy ramifications of the 
separation of ownership and control? 
Institutions  Institutional arrangements need to be 
explained 
The effects of institutions need to be 
explained 
Contracts  Contracts may be complete or 
incomplete, but the presence of 
transaction costs makes 
incompleteness more likely  
Contracts are complete, because 
actors are rational and there are no 
transaction costs. 
 
3. THE PATH TO FULL DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE THREE 
ECONOMIC THEORIES: PA, POSITIVE AGENCY AND TC ECONOMICS IN THE 
LAST 40 YEARS. 
The rediscovery of TCE and PA started in the 1960s – and it started rather confusingly (albeit to the 
benefit of economics in general). The first steps were made in works that sought to combine Coasian 
TCs with the Knightian concept of moral hazard. More specifically, these works conceptualised moral 
hazard as a potential TC that resulted from the existence of conflicting incentives: each actor seeks to 
maximize his own utility function; since actors are in the market for different reasons, they have 
different utility functions; this means that, when they enter in a contractual relationship, each will try 
to ‘pull’ the exchange towards his own goals; unless the others are aware of this, they will fall pray to 
(Contd.)                                                                   
perspective should focus on the ways real-world actors seek to minimize agency losses. A TCE perspective should focus 
on a comparative study of the determinants of such failure. (e.g. Guston 2000, who goes as far as to refer to the ‘integrity 
of research’.) Note also that the ‘opportunism’ of academics may not be due to cynicism, but merely to specific 
incentives which are incompatible with societal goals. For example, the measurement of performance by publishing 
scores, or the measurement of doctoral research performance by years-in-writing standards distorts academics’ incentives 
towards such specific ‘deliverable’, and away from time-consuming literature reviews and/or dissenting theoretical 
views.        Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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his morally hazardous behaviour; hence, they will either try to be fully aware of this, or they will avoid 
entering into the contractual relationship.  
Very soon, however, the existence of moral hazard was dissociated from TC. As we shall see 
below, the literature split into two branches: one that carried two sub-branches called PA theory, and 
PTA, and one that carried TCE. The first sub-branch of the first branch (PA theory, i.e. the formal, 
‘normative’ principal-agent theory associated with Arrow, Akerlof, Dewatripont, Holmström, Laffont, 
Martimort, Mirrlees, Pauly, Spence, and Tirole) worked under the assumptions of perfect rationality 
and ‘transaction costless-ness’. It focused on the causes and the effects of conflicting incentives and 
asymmetric information, and sought to (a) address the issue of efficient risk-sharing, and hence (b) 
provide a full characterization of the set of implementable allocations under conditions of imperfect 
information. Because the traditional topic of economics was markets, these theorists analysed 
‘horizontal’ contracts, i.e. situations where there is exchange but no formal hierarchy. The central 
themes and historical developments of this branch of the literature (PA theory) can be split into four 
overlapping phases: (1) work on the first consequences of moral hazard: in the presence of moral 
hazard, market allocations under uncertainty will not be unconstrained Pareto optimal (Arrow, 
Akerlof, Pauly, etc – see the reviews and references in the text below); (2) work on the implications of 
the first consequences: the properties of the second-best allocations need to be systematically analysed 
(Ross, Mirrlees, Holmström, Tirole, Grossman and Hart, etc); (3) work on methodologies for such 
systematic analysis: the Revelation Principle, the rent-efficiency trade-off, the Informativeness 
Principle (Green, Laffont, Myerson, Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin, Harris, Raviv, Holmström); and 
(4) work on extensions and reviews: multi-agents, common agency, renegotiation-proofness, 
dynamics, etc (Tirole, Laffont, Martimort, Dewatripont, etc).   
The second sub-branch of the first branch (the ‘positive’ theory of agency, PTA, associated with 
Fama, Jensen
12 and Meckling), by contrast, retained Berle and Means’ original focus and later became 
associated with the analysis of vertical relationships within an organisation. (This is probably a path-
dependent development which is independent of the original focus of the theory. Note also that 
vertical relationships in this theory are not to be confused with Coasian hierarchies and authority: the 
positive theory of agency relies explicitly on the assumption that all risk-sharing is voluntary). 
Although positive agency theory has always shared the normative theory’s concern for the causes and 
effects of conflicting incentives, this sub-branch has sought to explain empirical differences in the 
performance of different monitoring and bonding technologies within an organization (as expressed in 
the ex ante financial valuation of firms).  
The second branch carries an altogether different theoretical approach, TCE. TCE starts with the 
assumptions that (a) actors may be opportunistic [due to (c) below], but they are also boundedly 
rational, (b) TCs are a ubiquitous feature of markets, (c) market transactions are plagued by 
incomplete contracts, which generates both ex ante and ex post contracting problems, and (d) market 
transactions are plagued by lock-in among trading partners. TCE is concerned with many contracting 
issues, chief among which is the determinants of the boundaries of the firm. It is thus based more 
directly on Coase than on Berle and Means (whose work is only a secondary source of influence), and 
it is associated with the works of Williamson (1968, 1971, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1996), Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian (1978), and Joskow (1985). Halfway between, on the one hand, PA and PTA, and, on the 
other hand, TCE, Grossman, Hart, and Moore, planted incomplete contracts theory (´ICT´). 
In order to understand the far-reaching differences between these economic theories, it is useful to 
present the fundamental works in each one. I first present the more demanding normative PA theory, 
then the more accessible PTA, and then TCE and the property rights critique addressed to it, which is 
                                                      
12  In fact, Jensen (1983) made the distinction between ‘principal-agent theory’ (the normative, formal theory) and the 
‘positive theory of agency’ (the theory that political scientists call principal-agent theory). We will come back to the 
sources and the effects of this confusion in political science in the next section.    Yannis Karagiannis 
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usually labelled ICT. I conclude with a summary presentation of the differences between these 
theories.  
3.1. Normative Principal-Agent theory: asymmetric information, frictionlessness and ex ante 
optimization 
Starting with his path-breaking 1963 article, Kenneth Arrow re-introduced into economics the 
concepts of information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk-bearing. Arrow (who did 
not explicitly study the agency relationship, but who raised the same questions) thus made the most 
important contribution to PA theory since Berle and Means. More specifically, he started exploring the 
ramifications of information asymmetries in the health- and life-insurance markets, i.e. settings where 
the seller of insurance schemes cannot directly observe the characteristics of buyers of such schemes, 
and where the buyers have an incentive to overuse the insurance scheme. He thus posed the problem 
of the optimal allocation of risk-bearing under conditions of un-revealed private information (adverse 
selection and moral hazard): how can actors choose the socially optimum amount of reimbursement 
claims, so that no other choice can make every individual better off? His theoretically-driven answer 
was that ‘the competitive allocation of risk-bearing is guaranteed to be viable only if the individuals 
have attitudes of risk-aversion.’ (Arrow 1964: 91)[13] The policy implication was that policy needs to 
shape individuals’ attitudes accordingly. Rational actors should be able to resolve all the problems 
raised by the existence of private information by drawing appropriate ex ante solutions. Note four 
points here: Arrow (a) took an explicitly normative approach; (b) worked under the assumption of 
actors’ perfect rationality; (c) did not include the possibility of the existence of transaction costs, even 
when he discussed public policy implications; and (d) focused on optimal ex ante incentive 
alignments. These, I will show below, are fundamental differences between PA and TCE.      
Building on Arrow, and using the unlikely example of the second-hand market for cars (as well as 
insurance and credit markets), Akerlof (1970) analysed the effects of adverse selection and moral 
hazard and thereby established the basics of the theory of asymmetric information. In Akerlof’s 
market, some second-hand cars are in good working order (the ‘cherries’ – good-looking when you see 
them and sweet when you use them), while others have hidden defects (the ‘lemons’ – good-looking 
when you see them, but bitter when you use them). Yet, because of the existence of asymmetric 
information and the costs involved in correcting this condition, buyers don't know which cars are 
lemons and which are cherries. What they do know, however, is that car-dealers have an incentive to 
sell lemons packaged as cherries. One intermediary result of this interaction between divergent 
incentives, asymmetrical information and transaction costs, is that the market price of even cherries 
will eventually decrease (because, under uncertainty, demand will decrease for any kind of second-
hand car). The final result is that sellers of cherries are less inclined to sell their cars, and even a 
competitive market will only be filled with bad cars. The inefficiency does not only reside in the 
preponderance of lemons in the market, but also (and mainly) in the disappearance of the market for 
cherries. In PA terms (which Akerlof did not use), the impossibility of correcting the informational 
asymmetries between a principal (the prospective buyer, or the seller of a cherry car) and an agent (the 
car dealer) may lead to the collapse of the market through backwards deductions performed by the 
rational actors. In other words, unless the agent can offer a strong commitment to a minimum effort, 
there may be no exchange at all. But, the ability of the agent to make such a commitment is contingent 
upon the ability of the principal to not renegotiate the terms of the contract once the agent has made 
his investment.     
                                                      
13  Arrow later expressed doubts about the validity of his original insight. Normative PA eventually came to work most 
usually under the behavioral assumption of risk-neutral principal(s) and risk-averse agent(s).   Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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The far-reaching implications of Akerlof’s model were soon acknowledged by other economists, 
such as Arrow (again), Zeckhauser, Spence and Pauly,
14 who developed an important body of work on 
insurance problems. (In general, PA theory advances through applications of the same basic 
theoretical and methodological insights to different institutional contexts, with institutional differences 
being defined exogenously.) In this context, issues of commitment and renegotiation became more 
tractable, because the relationship between the principal and the agent develops over a longer period of 
time. However, these theorists did not extent their framework to incomplete contracts: due to its 
normative orientation, PA theory maintained its focus on complete contracts. It was shown that, due to 
adverse selection problems that pervaded the market for medical insurance, the insured were more 
likely to suffer a loss than the uninsured – again, the ‘bad’ won over the ‘good’. Indeed, the seller of 
an insurance scheme is often unable to accurately distinguish between higher- and lower-risk 
customers. For example, a life-insurer may be unable to distinguish between smokers (who had an 
incentive to hide their addiction in order to not incur the corresponding premium price) and non-
smokers. The insurer thus has to cover his risk by charging the same premium to both groups. This 
means that the insurance scheme on offer will be a relatively better deal for those covered by a smoker 
(e.g. his family) than for those covered by a non-smoker, and it will thus bias the customer base of the 
insurer in favour of smokers. But, if the insurer discovers this (i.e. if he learns that the mortality rates 
are higher among his customers than among the general population), he will further increase his 
premiums. As a result, non-smokers will prefer to not buy a life insurance, even though they were 
initially disposed to do so. In view of this market failure, some economists proposed a compulsory 
public insurance policy (Akerlof 1970; Arrow 1970), which would indirectly re-establish the rights of 
‘non-smokers’. Others seemed more sceptical regarding the substantive argument, but contributed to 
the development of the theoretical perspective (Pauly 1974). The normative inclination of PA theory, 
and the description of a frictionless (transaction-costs-less) world that were evident in Arrow’s work 
were thus reinforced by this new focus on the design of ‘mechanisms’ (i.e. optimal game forms 
proposed by the principal).    
In the meanwhile, an important development occurred when Ross (1973) put the foundations of 
modern contract theory with his first contribution to formal PA theory. Based on a view similar to 
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) property rights approach and to Williamson’s (1971, 1973) internal 
organization costs, Ross argued that much of the previous literature on moral hazard and informational 
asymmetries was actually concerned with contracts, and in particular with agency problems under 
conditions of uncertainty. His formal PA theory became very influential, most obviously because it 
raised a new question that complemented the one relating to the determinants of delegation. Simply 
put, Ross asked: what happens after delegation, and how is this taken into account at the time of 
delegation? Efforts to find the answer led to the creation of a new branch of economic theory, now 
called contract theory, incentives theory, implementation theory, or simply PA.    
The basic theoretical apparatus of the PA methodology was completed with the demonstration of 
the so-called Revelation Principle (Green and Laffont 1977; Myerson 1979; Dasgupta, Hammond and 
Maskin 1979; and Harris and Raviv 1979). The Revelation Principle states that for any indirect 
revelation mechanism to which the agent reports his type, there is a direct mechanism with the same 
outcome. Using such a direct mechanism does not involve any loss of generality, and computations 
that go on within the mind of an agent who participates in a non-direct mechanism now become part of 
the direct mechanism.  
The simplest way to understand this fundamental principle is by going back to an initial real world 
situation analysed by PA, i.e. a situation characterised by conflicting utility functions, incomplete 
                                                      
14  This does not mean, however, that Akerlof had been pushing an open door: before being published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, the ‘Market for Lemons’ had been rejected by The American Economic Review, the Review of 
Economic Studies, and the Journal of Political Economy. The explanation accompanying these rejections was that the 
topic was irrelevant and/or that the analysis was wrong. (Akerlof 2001)  Yannis Karagiannis 
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information and adverse selection. Both the principal and the agent will voluntarily accept to trade 
only if their expected payoff from participating (trading) exceeds the costs of their participation. In a 
game of incomplete information, the payoff-relevant private information of a player is called his 
‘type’, and each player has at least two possible types. In such situations, the players need to discover 
each other’s type; they thus need to agree upon a ‘revelation mechanism’ (i.e. a form of game) for 
communicating their type to one another; and thus they need to compensate each other for their 
participation and incentive compatibility costs. Evidently, by backwards deduction these decisions fall 
upon the principal, rather than upon the agent. In a revealing equilibrium of such a revelation 
mechanism each player is satisfied that his incentive and participation constraints (i.e. the conditions 
that need to be fulfilled in order for that player to not mimic another type than his real type) are met. 
The Revelation Principle is the idea that to any equilibrium corresponds an associated revelation 
mechanism that allows the players to truthfully report their types, subject to their participation and 
compatibility constraints being met. [Note the absence, by definition, of any factors that might impede 
the automatic application of the Principle, including the absence of (a) bounded rationality; (b) ex post 
communication bottlenecks; (c) costs related to the prevention of collusion between agents (or 
between the agent and external, competing principals); (d) agency costs imposed by the principal upon 
his own principals; (e) renegotiation costs; and (f) enforcement costs – in short, the absence of 
transaction costs.
15]  
Using the Revelation Principle, PA analysts were/are able to proceed to the analysis of the 
optimization problem of the principal, i.e. to stipulate an objective function for the organization and to 
calculate the effects of the trade-off between the achievement of allocative efficiency and the cost of 
insuring incentive compatibility – the so-called efficiency-rent trade-off. 
16 They were/are thus able to 
                                                      
15  Extensive work in the 1980s and 90s relaxed some (but not all) of these assumptions: on the most important point 
(renegotiation costs due to the impossibility of full commitment) see Dewatripont 1988; Hart and Tirole 1988; Laffont 
and Tirole 1993: chapter 9. Interestingly, Hart and Tirole (1988) found that non-commitment may lead to the standard 
Coasian durable good model, and hence (in terms of the analysis) to the need to incorporate transaction costs.  
16  Although it is useless to enter here into the most technical details of economic theory, this efficiency-rent trade-off is 
important for our purposes, too. It lies at the heart of PA theory, and political PA theory (if there is one to come) should 
duly take it into account. This trade-off can be understood as follows:  
INFORMATIONAL ASSYMETRY AND ADVERSE SELECTION: A principal (‘P’) delegates the production of an 
output to an agent (‘A’). P benefits from consuming the good produced by A, while A incurs a cost in producing it. 
However, before agreeing on the terms of the contract that binds them, only A knows the marginal cost of producing the 
good. P can therefore only try to calculate the risk taken by A when accepting to trade.  
FIRST BEST: In the absence of incomplete information, P would propose to A a take-it-or-leave-it offer, so that the 
marginal cost of producing the good would equal the marginal benefit of consuming it. P would define the output target 
and a lump-sum compensation. At the margin, A would then be indifferent between producing the good or not. 
[Equivalently, the terms of trade would be efficiently established by the market.]  
EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: Unlike in the first best scenario, a relatively efficient A will claim 
higher costs (i.e. will mimic the type of a relatively inefficient agent) and will ask for a lower target output for that sum, 
i.e. he will seek to gain an informational rent (to reveal his true type only with adequate compensation). P will therefore 
have to overcome this information asymmetry: (a) he will need to gain information from A, and thus pay an 
informational rent that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint; (b) he will need to ensure A’s participation, and 
thus induce the participation of A even if A is relatively inefficient. Thus, P will either have to pay an informational rent, 
or decrease the output requested to a relatively less efficient A (so that A reveals his true type, since the resulting 
downward distortion requested by P to the least efficient A will induce the most efficient A to reject that offer).  
THE TRADE-OFF: Hence, if P allows for the payment of an informational rent, he can be sure to collaborate with the 
most efficient A; if he does not allow for such a payment, he runs the risk of collaborating with a least efficient A. 
Resources will flow towards the most efficient A only if P accepts to pay a price for this allocative efficiency. 
The stated objective of PA theory is to find the structure of the optimal contract given these constraints. The theory does 
so without reference to either transaction costs or to the possibility of ending up with an incomplete contract – the focus 
is exclusively on the effects of incomplete information under different institutional configurations. Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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obtain a full characterization of the set of implementable allocations within an organization under 
informational constraints.  
Leaving aside the technical foundations and implications of the Revelation Principle (which relate 
to the trade-offs involved in ensuring the truthful cooperation of the agent), we can concentrate on 
what is of more direct relevance for the purposes of political-scientific research in inter-branch 
relations. First, the Revelation Principle is based on the assumptions that the principal can (a) perfectly 
reconstruct the strategies of the agent; (b) perfectly reflect these strategies in the mechanism that he 
proposes; and (c) perfectly commit himself to that mechanism, or else integrate his limited 
commitment into his initial offer (subject to paying a further price in order to satisfy the agent’s 
renegotiation-proofness constraint). In other words, PA theory continues to work under the 
assumptions of perfect rationality, limited uncertainty regarding the future, and thus complete 
contracts. (This is most probably due to Arrow’s legacy.)  
And, second, the Revelation Principle renders the boundaries of the firm irrelevant. As Malin and 
Martimort (2000) explicate, the optimal direct revelation mechanism may be implemented in many 
different, equivalent and indirect ways. For example, the agent may report his information first, and 
the principal may then choose the particular output target and compensation (in which case the agent 
has some freedom of action but no real authority). Alternatively, the principal may offer a nonlinear 
price first, and the agent may then choose within this ‘menu’ his most preferred option (in which case 
the agent does have some amount of real authority). In both cases, however, the Revelation Principle 
can lead to the production of an optimal output. By the same token, the Revelation Principle cannot 
serve to explain the allocation of authority within the firm, nor indeed whether the agent owns his own 
productive unit or is part of the same organization as the principal. According to Malin and Martimort, 
this amounts to an ‘irrelevance theorem’ regarding ownership: ‘… incentive theory [i.e. normative PA] 
has nothing to say about such things as the distribution of authority within an organization, the limits 
of the firm, the separation between the public and the private spheres of the economy, and more 
generally nothing to say about organizational forms and designs.’  (p. 129)           
In addition to studying the effects of adverse selection, PA theory is also interested in the effects of 
moral hazard. The archetypical analysis of moral hazard posits that: (a) The good to be traded between 
an agent and a principal may be of different qualities and these qualities are observable, contractible 
and enforceable; (b) The quality of the good depends on the effort put by the agent in its production, 
and that effort is costly (i.e. the agent’s utility function is not similar to that of the principal); (c) The 
agent may therefore choose the effort he will put in producing the good, or to not produce at all; (d) 
Neither the principal nor a court of law can directly observe and measure the effort put by the agent in 
the production of the good; and (e) The first-best solution (i.e. under complete information) would be 
to specify in the contract the value of the agent’s effort (e.g. with a flat payment that would be 
independent from the realized quality of the good). Such a contract would at the same time force the 
agent to exert the first-best level of effort, and allow him to be fully insured against uncertainty on his 
final performance.
17 However, condition (d) makes the first-best unfeasible. 
For these reasons, the principal must find a form of contract that reduces the negative effects of his 
incomplete information, while at the same time satisfying the agent’s incentive and participation 
constraints. As with adverse selection, the principal faces an optimization problem. The first step of 
the analysis thus consists in describing the set of feasible incentive contracts implementing a given 
level of effort. Here, two analytical options are available, depending on whether the agent is risk-
neutral or risk-averse: 
                                                      
17  This condition is particularly important, for it shows that the ‘first-best’ condition satisfies both the principal and the 
agent. Most political-scientific accounts that claim to be based on this theory do not acknowledge this condition. (As I 
will show below, this is most probably because their claim to be based on PA is false; the alternative hypothesis is that 
political scientists do base their work on PA, but have not understood it.)  Yannis Karagiannis 
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a)  With a risk-neutral agent, the principal can offer a ‘sell-out’ contract such that the incentives of 
the agent are aligned with the social incentives. This is achieved by having the agent pay a 
bond for the right to supply the principal, and having the principal pay an amount that depends 
on the quality realized. Under these conditions, the agent bears the whole responsibility for a 
bad performance (this is why this is feasible only with a risk-neutral agent). Note, however, that 
this is not feasible when institutions impose limited liability for the agent. With limited 
liability, the agent cannot be held totally responsible for bad performances; he is thus able to 
extract a limited liability rent. The principal can therefore offer only rewards (not 
punishments), and this makes him worse-off. This rent creates a rent-efficiency trade-off 
similar to the trade-off under adverse selection. 
b)  With a risk-averse agent, the principal must offer the agent both insurance (i.e. a fixed payment 
that is independent of the realized quality of the good), and incentives (i.e. a link between 
payment and the realized quality of the good). The resulting trade-off between insurance and 
incentives is called the incentive-intensity principle. In addition (for technical reasons that need 
not be presented here), higher levels of performance are more informative about the agent’s 
effort than lower levels. And finally, the optimal contract must only use informative signals, 
but not uninformative ones. Uninformative signals increase the probability of the agent taking 
more risk, but without a corresponding need to relax incentives. [This is Holmström’s (1979) 
Informativeness Principle.]     
By the mid-1980s, PA theory had reached a critical mass. At that moment, Grossman and Hart 
(1983, 1984, 1986) extended the theory to the analysis of incomplete contracts. Up to that point, PA 
had assumed that contracts can only be complete, in the sense that they foresee all relevant future 
contingencies, or at least that they foresee rules that allow to reach a common understanding of the 
nature of future contingencies. (Because the work of Grossman and Hart was presented as a 
constructive critique of TCE, I review it under that heading.)  
Before offering some preliminary comments on this theoretical literature, let us note that the basic 
insights and methodology of the Revelation and the Informativeness Principles have been extended to 
analyse various environments. The most important extensions for our purposes are those that consider 
environments with multiple principals, with multiple agents, and with dynamic relations. Let us turn 
very briefly to each one of these. 
Regarding the presence of multiple principals, note that the simple Revelation Principle 
methodology is based on the assumption that the single principal can costlessly prevent 
communication between his agent and outside (potential) principals. When this assumption is relaxed 
(which can only be done by allowing for transaction costs, and hence taking one element of the model 
exogenously), agents may seek to communicate with principals who have conflicting preferences. 
(This condition, which results in excessive rent extraction to the benefit of the agent, is sometimes 
described as a ubiquitous one in public policy-making.) Under such conditions, PA theory cannot use 
the Revelation Principle to describe the set of equilibrium allocations. Various scholars have thus 
developed a Taxation Principle (Martimort 1992; Martimort and Stole 1999a, 1999b, Peters 1999 – 
Martimort and Stole, and Peters are described in Malin and Martimort 2000), according to which non-
cooperating principals cannot offer an efficient direct mechanism that is an equilibrium. The only 
possible equilibrium is when (a) the common agent ‘taxes’ the principals by retaining all powers, and 
(b) the common agent does not communicate any information that could induce the principals to 
compete between them.  
Regarding the presence of many agents (‘common agency’), note that the simple Revelation 
Principle methodology is again based on the assumption that the principal can costlessly prevent 
communication between his agents. When this assumption is relaxed (which, again, can only be done 
by allowing for transaction costs), agents may seek to collude, either between themselves (e.g. workers 
against the interests of managers), or with their supervisors (e.g. workers and managers against the 
interests of shareholders). Such collusion may have a negative impact on the efficiency of the Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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organization. When this is so, the principal will draft his offer subject to one additional constraint, the 
coalition incentive compatibility constraint (‘CICC’). The addition of CICC in the principal’s calculus 
will guarantee that possible coalitions do not gain from colluding against the principal (Tirole 1986, 
1992; Laffont and Martimort 1997). The Revelation Principle can accommodate this additional 
constraint.      
Finally, regarding dynamic relationships, these can take many forms. The starting point is the 
assumption behind the use of the Revelation Mechanism that the principal can fully commit to the 
mechanism he proposes to the agent. The first-best is characterised by full commitment: the contract is 
complete, and it foresees large penalties in case of renegotiation. In the real world, however, the 
execution of a contract may reveal information about the existence of a Pareto-efficient re-negotiation. 
In the presence of limited abilities to commit (which are taken exogenously), the principal will foresee 
these, and he will accordingly offer an initial contract that takes renegotiation-proof constraints into 
account (i.e. adding these to the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints of the standard 
Revelation Principle).    
The most relevant features of PA theory for our purposes are thus the following: 
1)  PA theory is based on the assumptions of perfect rationality and TC-lessness. PA analysis cannot 
be performed if these assumptions are relaxed to include bounded rationality, communication 
problems, inefficacious court ordering, etc. Empirical analyses of ex post contracting problems 
that cannot be comprehensively resolved ex ante violate the basic assumptions of the theory and 
are non-sensical.  
2)  Participation is voluntary: both in adverse selection and in moral hazard, the agent has an outside 
option, which is non-participation and non-production respectively. It is the existence of these 
options that create a set of constraints that the principal must satisfy in order to proceed to 
optimization. Empirical analyses that attempt to use PA without focusing on these constraints and 
on the resulting optimization problem of the principal are not principal-agent analyses.  
3)  PA theory does not treat the location of the agent as relevant: the agent may be part of the 
principal’s organization, or he may own his own production unit. In both cases, the optimization 
problem facing the principal is the same. Attempting to explain either the location of the agent, or 
the consequences of his location place the analysis outside the PA framework. 
4)  PA theory does not attempt to explain the existence of multi-agent organisations: where these 
exist, they are defined exogenously, and their existence is usually attributed conjecturally to the 
need to (a) share common resources, (b) produce public goods, (c) internalise production 
externalities, or (d) enjoy information economies of scale.  
5)  Nevertheless, the existence of more than one agent is relevant in many respects: it affects the 
implementation concept proposed by the principal, the corresponding incentive feasibility, and 
ultimately the principal’s payoff. Similarly, the theory admits that the optimal multilateral contract 
is very sensitive to the structure of information. The prevailing view here is that, unless (a) the 
multiple agents are risk-neutral and not risk-averse, (b) the multiple agents do not know each-
other’s type, and (c) the principal can condition one agent’s compensation on another agent’s 
report, the principal will not be able to fully extract the rent from all agents (Martimort 2006).   
6)  This theory takes into account the allocational effects of multiple and competing agents: when the 
multiple agents have types that are independently distributed, they will be able to extract rents 
from the principal. However, the distribution of these rents among the agents depends on the 
externalities that one agent’s tasks may exert on another agent’s tasks.  
7)  However, the theory admits that, in competitive environments, agents face a lesser incentive to 
report untruthfully (i.e. to overstate their costs), since competition among them creates a threat that 
such ‘overstaters’ will be excluded from production. This means that agents will either collude or 
loose rents. But collusion, too, can be avoided by the principal, for example by delegating more 
powers to lower levels of the hierarchy (Tirole 1986). Yannis Karagiannis 
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8)  Thus, PA is not the ‘pop-theory’ usually presented by political scientists. It does not tell us 
anything about the causes of delegation, nor about ex post contracting issues – at least not directly. 
Analysing the relationship between one or more principals and one or more agents, all of whom 
are boundedly rational, all of whom seek to economize on TCs, all of whom supposedly have 
different goals and are engaged in incessant fights between themselves subject to institutional 
rules, are not conditions that correspond to this theory. PA is a very specific body of normative 
theoretical work, whose adoption requires a strict respect of its underlying assumptions (and a lot 
of mathematics!).        
3.2. Positive agency theory: incomplete contracts, agency losses, and periodical bargaining over 
ownership issues 
As mentioned above, the pioneering insights of Berle and Means did not immediately find their way 
into economics (or political science). These insights regarding the causes and consequences of the 
separation of ownership and control of large US corporations were revived only four decades later, in 
the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling argued that managers will not act to 
maximize the returns to shareholders unless appropriate governance structures are implemented; 
however, they explicitly mentioned that their positive theory of agency differed from the normative 
focus of principal-agent theory: the latter was concerned with the optimal solution to agency problems, 
while they were concerned with the effects of existing solutions (at 308). Because their work is the 
undisputed foundational work of modern agency theory, it is useful to present it in some detail.  
Jensen and Meckling sought to combine the theories of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) 
finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of the firm. Their theory aimed at explaining the 
value of several dependent variables, chief among which were: 
 1. why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure (containing 
both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total 
value of the firm is less that it would be if he were the sole owner, and why this result is 
independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor 
markets; 2. why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent with efficiency. 
(at 305) 
The theoretical starting points were two: (1) the theory of the firm was actually a theory of markets 
that treated the firm as a black box (i.e. as a profit-maximizing production function), and not a theory 
of how conflicting interests inside the firm were brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result; and 
(2) the developing literatures on property rights and agency costs were different, but similar and 
complementary. The problem was therefore to use these theories in order to develop a genuine theory 
of the firm, while retaining the assumption that all individuals are resourceful, evaluative, maximizing 
and rational. Thus, Jensen and Meckling started with the following five assumptions
18: 
1)  Costs and rewards are allocated among the participants in any organization according to a 
contractual (explicit or implicit) specification of property rights. These property rights create 
claims, and it is these claims that structure the incentives faced by the parties. (An obvious 
implication of this is that relations are set in a strategic context.) 
2)  Relationships within an organization can be understood as involving a contract between one or 
more principals and one agent, each having a different utility maximizing function.
19 Jensen 
and Meckling analyse the relationship between equity holders (principals) and managers 
                                                      
18  These are the assumptions that are most relevant for our purposes. Jensen and Meckling introduce many more technical 
assumptions, only some of which are reported in the fifth point here.  
19  Jensen and Meckling are interested in hierarchical relationships within an organization, but clearly point to the fact that 
the agency problem exists in any kind of cooperative venture, whether vertical (as within some governmental authorities 
and bureaus) or horizontal (as between some governmental authorities or bureaus).  Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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(agents). The principals can limit ‘aberrant activities of the agent’ with appropriate incentives 
and costly monitoring; the agent may benefit from guaranteeing his allegiance to the principals’ 
goals by incurring bonding costs. Both of these activities are costly: optimization does not 
equal zero divergence between the agent’s actions and the maximization of the principals’ 
welfare – there is always a residual cost due to inevitable shirking. Hence: Agency costs = 
monitoring expenditures + bonding costs + residual loss. Crucially, all players are assumed to 
act under a budget constraint. For example, the principals monitor the agent subject to their 
budget constraint.   
3)  Contrary to Coase (1937), activities within the firm are not governed by authority, but by 
contracts that vehicle voluntary exchanges (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Organizations 
(including governmental bodies and states) are therefore legal fictions (i.e. artificial constructs 
that are legally treated as individuals) that serve as a nexus for a set of voluntary contracting 
relationships. In addition, firms are also characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
claims on their assets and cash flows which can generally be sold without permission of the 
other contracting individuals. 
4)  The starting condition is one where the manager of the firm is also its owner. He/she has to 
decide whether to continue with this financial structure (which allows him/her to enjoy various 
non-pecuniary benefits, but which comes at a cost in terms of availability of capital), to appeal 
to the equity market (including the extent of that appeal; such an appeal relaxes the financial 
constraints of the firm, but comes at a cost in terms of non-pecuniary benefits), or to take on 
debt (which, contrary to equity, does not dilute ownership).  
5)  Among a number of permanent assumptions, we find the following: (a) no trade credit is 
available; (b) all outside equity shares are non-voting; (c) no outside owner gains utility from 
ownership in any way other than through its effect on his wealth or cash flows; (d) dynamic 
and multiperiod aspects are ignored; and (e) there exists a single manager with ownership 
interest in the firm.     
These assumptions have several far-reaching consequences. The five most relevant for our 
purposes of inter-branch analyses are the following:  
a)  ‘Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish between things that are ‘inside’ 
the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are ‘outside’ of it. There is in a very 
real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e. contracts) between the legal fiction (the 
firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.’ (section 
1.5) 
b)  ‘the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as ‘what should be the objective 
function of the firm?’ or ‘does the firm have a social responsibility?’ is seriously misleading. The 
firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in 
which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other 
organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this 
sense the ‘behavior’ of the firm is like the behaviour of a market, that is, the outcome of a 
complex equilibrium process.’ (section 1.5) 
c)  Equity and debt generate different agency costs, and so do different degrees of equity or debt. 
When a wholly-owned firm is managed by the owner, the optimum mix between of the various 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary (e.g. prestige, appointment power, level of employee discipline, 
personal relations, slack, purchase of inputs from friends, etc) benefits is achieved when the 
marginal utility of expenditure is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal 
utility of an additional dollar of after-tax purchasing power (wealth). With equity, the owner-
manager bears only a fraction of the cost of his non-pecuniary benefits: the larger the proportion 
of outside equity, the greater the agency costs that it generates. On the other hand, equity markets 
anticipate these effects, hence prospective minority shareholders deduct agency costs from the 
price they are willing to pay for equity, and hence the owner-manager bears the entire wealth Yannis Karagiannis 
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effects of these costs. In addition, as the fraction of the manager’s own ownership falls, 
monitoring becomes more rigorous (or bonding expenditures increase), perquisites diminish, and 
the value of the firm increases. With debt, the owner-manager can increase his non-pecuniary 
benefits. However, this happens because debt generates perverse incentive effects: the owner-
manager engages in investments which promise very high payoffs if successful, even if they have 
a very low probability of success. ‘If they turn out well, he captures most of the gains; if they turn 
out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs.’ For that reason, ‘we don’t find many large firms 
financed almost entirely with debt-like claims.’ (section 4.1) [
20] 
d)  The probability distribution of future cash flows depends on the capital (i.e. ownership) structure 
of the firm, because that structure determines the existence and the level of agency costs. This 
result is not only contrary to the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem (see above); it is also 
contrary to the view that cash flows depend on structure because that structure determines 
bankruptcy costs. The existence of agency costs will determine the ownership structure of the 
firm; and given the perverse effects of debt on agency costs, agency costs will balance the 
structure in favour of equity.
 21 
e)  The level of activity of the firm, the operational risk assumed by managers, and the agency costs 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control do not depend on the competitive 
environment of the firm, but on the incentive structure that results from the allocation of property 
rights. In particular, whether a firm is a monopolist or not, equity- and bond-holders will face an 
inherent incentive to protect their wealth. 
Crucially, the method followed consists of two steps: (A) an identification and explanation of 
agency costs, given assumptions 1-3 above; and (B) an explanation of how these agency costs affect 
organizational structures. In other words, it is the explanation of why and how the corporate form (i.e. 
an organizational form that is a nexus of contracts between voluntarily collaborating individuals who 
can exercise their right to exit without preconditions) generates agency costs that leads to a theory of 
the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm. In the absence of the first step of the analysis, it is 
impossible to proceed to the second step. Note three important points here: first, in the theory, the first 
step is made by the agent (it is the agent who decides whether he wants any principals and, to a lesser 
extent, what powers they should have over him); second, the theory depends on the existence of 
competitive and transparent financial markets that value firms (including agency costs) ex ante (there 
are no ex post costs that financial valuation cannot pre-establish); and third, it is implicitly assumed 
that any (improbable) ex post dispute can be efficiently resolved through public ordering (the judicial 
system). 
The most important result of Jensen and Meckling for our purposes is that the initial owner-
manager ultimately bears the entire wealth effects of the (expected) agency costs. Thus, ‘although the 
separation of ownership from control attenuates profit incentives, that is anticipated at the time 
separation occurs and is fully reflected in the price of new shares … The future therefore holds no 
surprises; all of the relevant contracting action is packed into ex ante incentive alignments.’ 
(Williamson 1985: 27) The result reached by Jensen and Meckling is less surprising (though 
innovative at its time) when one considers the assumptions underlying this theory, particularly 
regarding the rationality of actors (including in their anticipatory actions and reactions), the perfect 
functioning of financial markets, and the limitation of the utility of ownership to cash flows.    
The next main step in the development of agency theory was the work of Fama and Jensen (1983). 
This important and accessible contribution is probably the single most influential article in political-
                                                      
20  The difference between equity and bonds is important – and possibly for political scientific analyses, too. However, it is 
enough to present it here without going into the details of finance theory, since these details do not obviously reflect 
similar differences in politics.  
21  One of the referees points out that Jensen’s initial conclusions on this point were subsequently revised, given the ubiquity 
of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) characterized by a high level of debt. Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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scientific works that claim (misleadingly) to be based on ‘principal-agent’ theory. It is therefore 
necessary to present its assumptions, its logic and its conclusions in some detail, too.  
Fama and Jensen started by expressly referring to Berle and Means, and then defined their goal as 
follows: ‘we are concerned with the survival of organizations in which important decision agents do 
not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions.’ Given this dependent variable, 
Fama and Jensen proceeded by setting out the following four sets of assumptions and definitions:  
1)  Organizations are nexuses of contracts (as in Jensen and Meckling 1976). The two most central 
contracts specify (a) the nature of residual claims, and (b) the allocation of the steps of the 
decision process among agents. ‘These contracts distinguish organizations from one another 
and explain why specific organizational forms survive.’ (at 302) Regarding (a), concentrating 
residual claims to one group of actors reduces monitoring costs, adjustment costs, and 
production costs, and hence increases the survival probability of the organization. Regarding 
(b), there are four identifiable steps of the decision process: (A) initiation, (B) ratification, (C) 
implementation, and (D) monitoring. Steps (A) and (C) correspond to ‘decision management’ 
functions, while (B) and (D) correspond to ‘decision control’ functions. 
2)  Residual claims can be categorised as open or close, according to the restrictions that they 
impose on their owners. Open claims are those that do not impose any obligations on their 
owners and which therefore allow unrestricted risk sharing (e.g. common stocks of large 
publicly-listed corporations). Closed claims impose restrictions, in that they can only belong to 
internal decision agents (e.g. stocks of small family firms). The crucial difference between 
these two systems lies in the number of risk-bearing actors. (Note how residual claims 
correspond to residual risk-bearing: if everything goes well, claims are positive; if everything 
goes badly, they are negative.) 
3)  Agency costs arise because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced, and because 
output is never perfectly aligned with risk-bearers’ preferences - see Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Agency problems arise when decision managers are not the major residual claimants 
and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. In such cases, 
effective control procedures are necessary. Hence, residual claimants must separate ‘decision 
control’ (which they may exercise themselves) from ‘decision management’ (which they may 
delegate). 
4)  Organizations are distinguished according to their complexity. ‘Noncomplex’ means that 
specific information (i.e. detailed information that is costly to transfer among actors) relevant 
to decisions is concentrated in one or a few actors. ‘Complex’ means that specific information 
relevant to decisions is diffused. [There is a rough (but imperfect) equivalence between an 
organization’s size and its complexity.] Fama and Jensen ‘take it as given that optimal 
organizations in some activities are noncomplex.’  
The main question regards the determinants of the combination or separation of (a) residual claims, 
(b) decision control, and (c) decision management, or any two of these. When it is more efficient to 
combine (b) and (c) (e.g. in small noncomplex organizations), control becomes relatively costly, and 
this makes it preferable to combine (a), too. However, this comes at a cost, since it sacrifices the 
benefits of unrestricted risk-sharing and specialization. On balance, then, combination occurs only 
where the benefits of unrestricted risk-sharing and specialization of decision functions are less than the 
costs that would be incurred to control the resulting agency problems. This is indeed the case where 
small noncomplex organizations are characterized by trust, by the absence of demands for a wide 
range of specialized decision agents, by low total risk of net cash flows to be shared, and by low 
demands for wealth from residual claimants. (See also Fama and Jensen 1983b.) 
Separation of (a) and (b), on the other hand, occurs when it is more efficient to separate (c) from 
(a): the agency problems that result from the efficient separation of decision management from 
residual risk-bearing are best confronted by separating decision control from decision management. Yannis Karagiannis 
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The separation of decision management from residual risk-bearing may be due to the fact that the 
corresponding organizations are complex, i.e. to the fact that decision-specific knowledge is diffused 
and costly to transfer.
22 In that case, the agency problems of diffuse decision management can be 
reduced by separating the management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions.    
The institution of the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives (as opposed to 
other organizational arrangements, or competing organizations with such different arrangements) 
because of two reasons: (a) it allows to benefit from the specialization of management and risk-
bearing; and (b) its potentially negative effects are mitigated by the creation of control mechanisms. 
Crucially, Fama and Jensen did not deny the relevance of (a), but placed more emphasis on (b). Hence, 
the question of the survival of such organizations was answered by pointing to the separation of the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions. 
Several points need to be stressed regarding Fama and Jensen’s contribution. First, delegation may 
be a central concern to their theory, but this is not a theory of delegation. Note, for example, that the 
separation between (a) and (c) is the starting, not the ending, point of the separation between (a) and 
(b). Complexity is taken as given. This is most probably due to the fact that Fama and Jensen were 
implicitly referring only to large corporations engaged in the production of technological or complex 
financial products. In such cases, complexity is a matter of technology, and it can therefore only be 
defined exogenously. Second, these scholars were interested in the survival of organizations in 
competitive environments (which, as a research question, differs from the reasons for their creation of 
such organizations, the degree of separation of functions, and the consequences of such separations); 
in other words, their argument did not concern environments where the organization has some degree 
of monopoly power.
23 The functionalist explanation of organizational survival was inherently linked 
to the existence of such competitive pressures
24. Third (and related), Fama and Jensen argued that the 
case under investigation (the survival of organizations where decision is separated from risk-bearing) 
is relevant for many categories of organizations, including non-profit organizations; nevertheless, they 
explicitly limited their analysis to (a) private-sector organizations that (b) depended on voluntary 
contracting. Fourth, the model was based on an understanding of the organization as a nexus of 
contracts, and among these contracts one of the two most important ones concerned the nature of 
residual claims, i.e. the definition of the residual risk-bearers. It was precisely that explicit definition 
of the residual risk-bearers (i.e. the definitional absence of the availability of blame-shifting strategies) 
that motivated the principals in their control of the agents.    
The positive theory of agency immediately raised the interest of management scholars (Foss 2005; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Donaldson and Davis 1991) and public management scholars (Lane 2003). Of 
particular interest is the work of Lex Donaldson and James Davis, who sought to test the empirical 
                                                      
22  In their own words, ‘Most organizations characterized by separation of decision management from residual risk bearing 
are complex. … Again, we take it as given that the optimal organizations in some activities are complex.’ 
23  In their own words, ‘the form of organization that delivers the output demanded by customers at the lowest price, while 
covering costs, survives.’ (at 302) 
24  This point is particularly important for political-scientific ‘principal-agent’ models. [Such models are evidently more 
influenced by Fama and Jensen´s PTA (and, to a lesser but unspecified extent, by Williamsonian TCE) than by the 
economic PAt literature.] In these models, delegation of powers to a bureaucratic agent is said to be explained by 
reference to functionalist reasons (i.e. searching for causes by looking at effects). This may be attributable to Fama and 
Jensen’s functionalist ‘natural selection’ approach, whereby (1) relatively efficient types are discovered by looking at 
types that survive, (2) survival is explained by looking at organizational differences between surviving and disappearing 
types, and (3) these differences are assumed to be the determinants of relative efficiency. Note, however, that Fama and 
Jensen did not describe delegation as their dependent variable: they assumed that some delegation would occur 
exogenously. In addition, their functional logic was strictly limited to the point mentioned above. This is evident from 
their non-functional distinction between profits and survival: ‘producing outputs at lower cost is in the interests of 
residual claimants because it increases net cash flows, but lower costs also contribute to survival by allowing products to 
be delivered at lower prices.’ (at 305)        Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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validity of agency theory against the opposite hypotheses generated by stewardship theory. As 
mentioned above, agency theory in the Berle & Means and Jensen & Meckling tradition stipulates that 
shareholders’ interests will be safeguarded only where the chairmanship of the board of directors is 
separated from the chief executive officer (‘CEO’) function. This separation serves to introduce an 
essential element of control upon otherwise opportunistic CEOs. Stewardship theory, by contrast, 
stipulates that (a) there is no general problem of executive motivation and incentive compatibility 
constraints, and thus, (b) a more critical factor for shareholder returns is a correctly designed 
organization structure which allows the CEO to take effective action. By granting real authority to the 
CEO, shareholders provide him/her with the ability to quickly and adequately respond to changing 
circumstances, thus allowing the uninterrupted pursuit of value creation. According to Donaldson and 
Davis, these two theories correspond to different ‘models of man’ (at 51), i.e. different fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of the social world. (The authors of this study found evidence against 
agency theory and some evidence in favor of stewardship theory.)    
Positive agency theory is therefore not merely a simplification of the normative PA theory, but also 
a footnote to that theory. It is a simplification in so far as it adopts a less formal style, while accepting 
many of the assumptions of PA (it accepts the analysis of relationships as contracts; it accepts the 
existence of opportunism and different utility functions, and it accepts the view that asymmetric 
information poses coordination problems – however, it does not seek to demonstrate any of these 
elements). It is also an important footnote in so far as it is also founded on the idea of costly 
transactions – this in itself represents a significant departure from PA theory. In addition, where PA 
theory assumes a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, most works in positive agency theory 
make the opposite assumption: they define a risk-averse principal and a risk-neutral agent. Finally, the 
goal of agency theory is to specify the mechanisms used by real-world organizational institutions in 
order to reduce agency loss, such as incentive schemes, monitoring and sanctions.  
3.3. Transaction
25 costs economics: friction, incomplete contracts, lock-ins, and governance 
TCE is an elaboration on (mainly) Coase’s and (secondarily) Berle and Means’ original insights on the 
role of organizational factors in economics. Despite some obvious similarities with PA and PTA (i.e. 
the institutional focus and the opportunism assumption), TCE economics differs in some fundamental 
ways, which pertain to assumptions, analysis and results. It should therefore be contrasted with these 
theories. TCE cannot enter a PA analysis as an ad hoc consideration, for PA is explicitly based on the 
assumption that there are no TCs. Conversely, PA concepts should not enter a TCE analysis on an ad 
hoc basis. Needless to say, the same holds for TCE, PTA, and ICT. 
As mentioned above, Coase (1937) had raised the questions of the determinants of the scope of the 
firm, and argued that transactions will be organized in the firm (‘integration’) when the cost of doing 
this is lower than the cost of doing it in the market.
26 This idea was resurrected by Williamson, who is 
by far the most important writer in TCE (Williamson 1963, 1964, 1967, 1968, 1973, 1975, 1983, 1985, 
1996 – but see also Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978, and Joskow 1985, 1987). Let us then present a 
summary of Williamsonian TCE, turning first to its origins and some of its main developments, and 
then to a summary presentation of its main points for our purposes.   
Williamson (1963, 1964) started by focusing on the nature of the firm, and by attempting to treat it 
as a governance structure (i.e. an organizational construction) rather than, as in the neoclassical mode, 
as a production function (i.e. rather than as a technological construction). For this reason, he first 
                                                      
25  A transaction occurs ‘when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface.’ (Williamson 
1985: 1) In politics, this is the case whenever a political entrepreneur shares his idea with someone who will help him, 
whenever a legislative committee sends a bill to the floor, whenever the legislature delegates powers to the bureaucracy, etc. 
26  Note here that there is a notable difference between integration and ‘delegation’; the latter occurs both in market and in 
integrated settings, and its causes and implications are not topics that are specific to TCE. Yannis Karagiannis 
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analyzed managerial discretion in the firm, and the effects of such discretion on the firm’s behavior. 
He systematically referred to Coase, Knight, Berle and Means, and Simon, and laid the foundations of 
the concepts of incomplete contracts, asset-specificity, and adaptation. Indeed, because the most 
obvious example of the need for adaptation was the employment contract [to which Coase had 
originally referred, Simon (1951) had already analysed in terms of incomplete contracts, and Berle and 
Means (1932) had … failed to place at the heart of financial economics], Williamson analysed such 
‘vertical’ contracts, i.e. situations where the exchange involves a command-and-control function in 
return for a remuneration (in Simon’s original phrasing, ‘authority relationships’, Simon 1951: 293). 
Williamson posited that management (i.e. the employees of shareholders) was responsible for three 
inter-related decisions: (a) prices and maximum profits, (b) marketing expenditures, and (c) own 
remuneration. Each of these decisions could serve as the basis for decisions in the other two. The 
question then, was which of the three decisions, (a), (b), or (c), would prevail over the other two. 
Building on the work of Baumol (1959), Williamson showed that rational managers might not only 
display a preference for (b) and (c), but might actually be able to impose their decisions on 
shareholders who preferred (a). (Note the similarity with the conclusions of Berle and Means.) His 
proof consisted in showing through careful case studies that managerial discretion mattered: in 
commercial crises that took the form of sharp decreases in demand, the typical reaction of managers in 
those firms where management enjoyed discretion consisted in a disproportionate cut of expenses 
compared to all the other outlays. This falsified the profit-maximising hypothesis (e.g. Friedman 
1953), which predicted that in times of crisis all outlays would be reduced proportionately. By the 
same token, these two articles served to revitalise interest in governance structures and agency 
problems.           
In a subsequent article on competition policy, Williamson (1968) argued that non-standard (i.e. 
apparently anti-competitive hierarchical governance) corporate behavior, such as franchise restrictions 
and mergers, should not be automatically attributed to monopolization strategies, but rather to efforts 
to minimize TCs. Thus, although some franchise agreements and/or mergers may indeed lead to some 
efficiency losses (higher prices), such effects are almost always outweighed by efficiency gains (lower 
TCs).
27 This set the stage for the development of what Williamson has called the TCE approach of the 
efficiency branch of contract (1985: 26-9). In particular, the main insights of the 1968 paper were to 
lead to the full explication of the consequences of transaction-specific assets and bilateral monopoly.    
In subsequent work (1973, 1975), Williamson attempted a synthesis of two literatures of the 
emerging new-institutionalist approach: on the one hand, the ‘horizontal’ literature on possible market 
failures and, on the other hand, the ‘vertical’ literature on governance problems within the firm. He 
argued that ‘concern with the study of market failures should be expanded to include ‘institutional 
failures’ (of internal organization, political, and judicial types) more generally [because] substantially 
the same factors that are ultimately responsible for market failures also explain failures in internal 
organization.’ (1973: 316) In other words, Williamson argued that the same concepts and models that 
can be used to study contracts between firms can be used to study relationships inside firms, and vice 
versa (1975, chapter 1). Where external procurement is plagued by incomplete contracts, lock-ins 
among trading partners, increasing opportunism, and correspondingly high efficiency losses, internal 
procurement mediates these problems, but creates issues of bureaucratic costs and low-powered 
incentives. He therefore implicitly conceptualized discrete market exchange and centralized 
hierarchical organization as defining the extremes of a continuum. Between these two extremes lie an 
infinite number of possible institutional arrangements (quasi-markets). His focus thus turned to the 
determinants of particular institutional arrangements, where the dependent variable could take a very 
large number of values. Measured by the degree of institutionalization of the solution, these could be 
any of the following (or anything between these values): no exchange, market exchange, quasi-market 
                                                      
27  Note that this result may be inconsistent with Williamson’s previous work, which, as mentioned above, emphasized 
managers’ non-efficiency motivations and hence their inefficient strategies. This apparent inconsistency became one of 
Williamson’s motivations in further research. Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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exchange, quasi-hierarchy exchange, hierarchy exchange, and complete hierarchical contract. 
(Specifications regarding the fundamental assumption of forbearance prevailing in internal allocational 
disputes came later.)   
Note here that Williamson did not make explicit use here of the developing PA theory. First, he 
explicitly referred to political and judicial institutional failures, thus differentiating his economics 
from the perfectly rational, frictionless, complete, and ex ante contracting world of PA. Second, his 
research questions now concerned the determinants of the boundaries of the firm (and the relative 
advantages of different institutional structures), not solely the internal organization of the firm. 
(Although it is true that PA theory might in principle be used to study both issues, it is also true that it 
cannot differentiate between the two.) Williamson’s goal being to develop a theory that endogenised 
the formation of both institutions and governance structures, he had to adopt a larger and different 
lens.            
More specifically then, Williamson posed again the classic Coasian question of why some firms 
choose to rely more on the market (i.e. have more open boundaries and therefore face higher market 
TCs), while others choose to rely more on hierarchy (i.e. have more defined boundaries and therefore 
face lower market TCs but higher internal organization costs). In order to answer this question he 
referred to the concepts of asset-specificity, time inconsistency, hold-up, and private ordering. Let us 
turn now to these fundamental concepts of TCE.  
Like Coase (1937, 1972), Williamson argued that hierarchy could be explained by reference to its 
role in transaction costs-economizing, and that it would be expanded until TCs of managing 
transactions within the firm met TCs of mediating transactions through the market. Yet, his first 
original contribution was to add that there exists a fundamental difference between environments 
characterized by competition and environments characterized by asset specificity and thus bilateral 
monopoly. In competitive environments, firms may be subject to both bounded rationality and to 
opportunism. But, in the absence of asset specificity, they have no continuing interests in the identity 
of one another: competition makes discrete market contracting efficient, even in the presence of 
bounded rationality and opportunism. In the presence of asset specificity, however, the pair-wise 
identity of the parties matters, and thus external competition cannot lead to efficiency. The only 
circumstance in which asset specificity might not lead to considerable inefficiencies is where the 
judicial system (court ordering) is efficient. However, in the presence of bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and transaction costs (i.e. the assumptions of TCE), this cannot be easily achieved, and 
hence asset specificity usually leads to inefficient outcomes. Contractual safeguards (e.g. exclusivity 
contracts, or integration), then, are a legitimate (efficient, not monopolization-minded) way to re-
establish some measure of efficiency: they are ‘safeguards to protect investments’. (Williamson 1975, 
1983, 1985: 32) 
It is important to note that, although neo-classical economics had made some inroads into this idea, 
Williamson (1983, 1985) offered a totally original interpretation. Economists had long recognized that 
firms might not always be able to buy their inputs, or sell their outputs, on competitive markets. For 
example, bilateral monopolies (where the specific output of a firm could serve as an input of only one 
other firmed) might impede that. However, they had argued that this would be rare, since most 
markets would be characterized by the existence of substitutable products and clients. Thus, neo-
classical economists recognized that non-standard contracting and/or integration might amount to 
benign strategies, but only under the very rare circumstances under which such asset specificity 
prevailed. Williamson’s original insight about asset specificity accepted this view, but also added an 
entirely new justification for non-standard contracting and/or integration. He acknowledged the 
existence of neo-classical exogenous (or, ‘technological’) dependencies, and, based on Klein at al. 
(1978), he went further to argue that dependency could also be endogenous (or, ‘contractual’). 
Dependency could result from inter-temporal, contractual factors: ‘what begins as a large numbers 
supply condition frequently is transformed into a small numbers exchange relation during contract 
execution and at contract renewal intervals.’ (1996: 26). Thus, ‘decisions to integrate are rarely due Yannis Karagiannis 
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to technological determinism but are more often explained by the fact that integration is the source of 
transaction cost economies.’ (1985: 87; the same applied to non-standard contracts) Only through non-
standard forms of contracts and/or integration can the firm put an end to endless bargaining and re-
contracting.   
The problems created by the Williamsonian dependency are best illustrated by the ‘hold-up’ 
metaphor (to which Williamson refers more commonly as ‘expropriation hazards’ – see also Joskow 
1985): when contracts are incomplete and incentives differ, and therefore when there is a potential 
problem of time-inconsistent incentives, the dependent party has to ensure that the other’s 
opportunistic behaviour does not generate a hold-up. Hence, once such contractual dependency arises 
and the ensuing hold-up risk becomes too important, integration represents a rational, economizing 
and non-monopolistic solution. Hence, according to Williamson, asset specificity is one of the most 
important of the critical dimensions on which transactions differ:  
Transaction cost economics … maintains that the most critical dimension for describing 
transactions is the condition of asset specificity. Parties engaged in a trade that is supported by 
nontrivial investments in transaction-specific assets are effectively operating in a bilateral trading 
relation with one another. Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to 
effect adaptability and promote continuity, becomes the source of real economic value. (1985: 30; 
see also 1996: 26)     
The penultimate important conceptual innovation of Williamson (at least for our purposes) was the 
link that he established between (a) asset specificity, (b) the problem of adaptation, and (c) credible 
commitments. The combination of asset specificity and bilateral dependency means that adaptations 
may become problematic. This is because, if asset-specificity is sought and a relationship-specific 
investment is to be made, the investor requires a credible commitment by his partner that the 
investment will actually be used (i.e. the investor needs to be insured because his costs are sunk). Yet, 
such a credible commitment will impede adaptation. And yet, adaptation is the central problem of 
economic organization (and, as Williamson repeatedly emphasized by referring to and correcting 
Machiavelli, political organization, too). Therefore, the parties (or at least one of them) face a trade-off 
between investment and flexibility. This trade-off is resolved either by referring disputes to an 
efficient court system (the existence of which is axiomatically denied), or by agreeing to exchange 
‘hostages’.  [Note here that the court system is not assumed away – it is only thought of as too costly 
to become the main dispute resolution mechanism (Williamson 1996: 122-23); thus, as the court 
system becomes comparatively inefficient, parties seek to establish governance structures (‘private 
ordering’).] In other words, the parties need to institute reciprocal trading relations that bond them: 
‘An alternative way [to arbitration] by which to protect contracts against expropriation is to expand 
the contractual relation. One way of accomplishing this is for the buyer and seller to devise a mutual 
reliance relation.’ (1996: 132) 
Finally, and crucially, Williamson defended the idea that internal ‘hierarchy is its own court of 
ultimate appeal.’ (1991, 1996: 98) This means that the contract law applicable to internal 
organizational disputes is that of forbearance (i.e. courts of law will forbear, in the sense that they will 
refuse to hear disputes between one internal division and another). In other words, being inside or 
outside a hierarchy matters, because being inside it forces one to adopt cooperative conflict-mitigating 
strategies, while being outside it allows one to be heard by a court of law. In economics, that means 
that firms differ from markets, because the employees of a firm will have to resolve their conflict 
within the firm; on the contrary, inter-firm relations will be regulated by the courts. To the best of my 
knowledge, this important issue has not been addressed by political scientists – at least not by those 
working on inter-branch relations. And yet, to the extent that it constraints our definition of different 
organizational actors, it is of vital importance to political science. (See Scharpf 1997: 52-60)  
Williamson’s conceptual innovations met with some skepticism [see the review of Grossman and 
Hart (1986) below] but were also strongly supported by empirical research. In particular, the 
pioneering empirical work of Joskow (1985, 1987) on contractual transactions between coal suppliers Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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and electric utilities showed that (a) it is unnecessary to refer only to the simple dichotomy between 
vertical integration and the market, since long-term contracts allow us to gain many interesting 
insights; (b) asset specificity considerations were indeed an important factor affecting the structure of 
vertical relationships in such markets; and (c) the level of relationship-specific investments determines 
both the length of commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage, and 
(negatively) the level of ex post bargaining. (‘Coal market transactions are interesting to focus on 
because there is considerable variation in the duration and structure of vertical relationships between 
buyers and sellers.’ Joskow 1987: 168) This relatively easy-to-grasp proposition has not been 
empirically tested in political science. 
Thus, Williamson and Joskow made a strong point in favour of the TCE approach, and, within the 
remit of this approach, against interpreting all non-competitive market outcomes (such as high profits, 
vertical integration, etc) as attributable to monopoly. Furthering his 1968 insights, and again 
contradicting the dominant neo-classical view (according to which high profits and/or a choice in 
favour of hierarchy was only attributable to monopolization), Williamson argued that such outcomes 
almost always have a more benign explanation: transactions cost-economizing strategies.   
Regarding the main characteristics of TCE, they can be summarized as follows: 
1)  The ultimate goal of TCE is to explain institutions and governance structures – that is the 
dependent variable. Like in PTA, the underlying assumption is that competition works as a 
mechanism of natural selection of the most efficient institutions.
28   
2)  Like PA, PTA, and ICT, TCE adopts a contracting orientation, in which both ex ante incentive 
alignments (PA and PTA) and property rights (ICT) matter. Contracts may be explicit or 
implicit, and thus every exchange relation qualifies. Unlike PA and PTA, however, TCE views 
contracting as problematic. The problem is not situated at the level of incentive alignments 
(which can be achieved ex ante via imaginative contracts), but at the levels of TCs (which 
contracts cannot resolve, and which thus create both ex ante and ex post problems) and asset 
specificity. Consequently, one of the originalities of TCE lies in its greater emphasis on the 
contract execution stage
29: ‘bargaining is pervasive’ (Williamson 1985: 29). 
3)  The behavioral attributes of human agents are opportunism (like in PA and PTA) but also 
bounded rationality (contrary to the perfect rationality assumption of PA and PTA). 
Opportunism means that actors are ‘self-interest seeking with guile.’ Bounded rationality 
means that behavior is ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.’ (Williamson 1985: 30, 45-
50; 1996: 8-9, 12, 36-7, 42-4, 173, 224-5) Obviously, self-interest may not be egoistic or 
immoral: in certain procuring transactions even the Red Half-Moon may be self-interested.    
4)  The operational research question of TCE is whether transactions are completed harmoniously, 
or whether there is instead an economic equivalent to mechanical friction, which would render 
transactions inefficient. Contrary to the PA and PTA, this question refers to both post-
contracting and ante-contracting issues. It thus refers both to institutions (the original contract), 
and to governance structures (the ex post adaptation mechanisms).  
5)  The basic tool of TCE is a micro-analytic focus on the organizational factors that affect 
transactions: asset specificity and the resulting TCs (or, more generally, the degree of hazard 
inherent in a transaction) are the independent variables. But, merely assuming the existence of 
TCs is not enough: TCs have to be operationalized by identifying the salient features of 
                                                      
28  It is impossible to dissociate economic theories from their reliance on the idea that actual or potential competition acts as 
a natural selection mechanism (the only exception being the quasi-theory of path dependence). This may be a 
consequential obstacle to their direct application to (some) political environments. Perhaps it is also an indication of the 
scope that different theories of institutional change should try to acquire (i.e. theories of institutional change should 
specify the nature, operation and extent of the mechanism of institutional selection on which they rely).       
29   Any study of post-contracting relationships can therefore benefit from performing a TCE analysis, rather than in 
engaging in non-sensical translations of PA or PTA concepts.   Yannis Karagiannis 
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different market, hierarchical, quasi-market organizational forms. Different organizational 
forms generate different TC levels, and these levels are best studied comparatively rather than 
as absolute values. Such TC may include ex ante and ex post costs. Note, however, that TCE 
acknowledges the presence of additional factors that may explain institutional and governance-
related decisions. In particular, ‘economizing takes place with reference to the sum of 
production and transaction costs, whence the tradeoffs in this respect must be recognized.’ 
(Williamson 1985: 22) This means that trying to minimize TCs may result in higher production 
costs, and vice versa. (This is reminiscent of, but clearly different from, the rent-efficiency 
trade-off in PA theory.) 
6)  Ex ante TCs include drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding costs. Depending on the level of 
drafting and negotiating costs, the contract may be more or less complete (drafting complete 
contracts is costly, but drafting incomplete contracts may generate frictions in the future – 
whence a trade-off that is resolved by the degree of bounded rationality, and hence by the 
complexity of the envisaged transaction). Depending on the level of safeguarding costs, the 
parties may agree to pool their property rights (which is not unproblematic), or to fashion 
signals of credible commitments.  
7)  Ex post TCs are due to the limitations of legal centralism (see the next point below). They 
include (a) maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment in relation to 
the ‘shifting contract curve’; (b) haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct 
ex post misalignments; (c) setup and running costs associated with the governance structures to 
which disputes are referred; and (d) bonding costs of effecting secure commitments.   
8)  Unlike PA and PTA, TCE assumes that court ordering (i.e. the use of the judicial system) is not 
a frictions-reducing mechanism, but a costly mechanism in its own right. Access to the court 
system, however impartial the latter may be, is costly. This is the source of ex post TC (see the 
previous point above): if courts could costlessly resolve any post-contracting issue, there would 
not be ex post TC (which is a defining assumption of PA theory, and which is rejected by 
TCE).   
9)  Acknowledging the existence of TC, and TC-economizing strategies and institutions, amounts 
to questioning the neoclassical skepticism towards nonstandard modes of economic 
organization, such as customer and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, block-booking, franchising, 
vertical integration, etc. Under conditions of uncertainty, bounded rationality, opportunistic 
behavior, and bilateral monopoly, such governance institutions do not amount to 
monopolization strategies, but should be interpreted as safeguards to protect investments.  
10) The method is comparative: ‘Transaction cost analysis supplants the usual preoccupation with 
technology and steady-state production (or distribution) expenses with an examination of the 
comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative 
governance structures.’ (Williamson 1985: 2, emphasis in the original) Contrary to PA and 
PTA, the focus here is not only on normative, but also on positive issues. The basic unit of 
empirical analysis is the individual transaction. Comparative analysis is therefore based on the 
view that (a) different governance structures represent different adaptive capacities and thus 
different levels of TCs; (b) different transactions differ in their attributes; and thus (c) TCs are 
economized by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way. 
(Williamson 2002: 441(v))   
For our purposes, the three most crucial points of Williamsonian TCE are these:  
First, the firm is not analyzed as a production function that consumes inputs in order to produce 
outputs in an otherwise unspecified way. On the contrary, that black box of neoclassical economic 
theory is opened up in order to be analyzed as a governance structure. Institutions and governance 
structures are then explained by reference to their transaction cost-economizing roles, rather than by 
reference to the production costs and profits of the firm (though overall efficiency is a necessary Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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requirement, in the absence of which an organizational form will be supplanted by competition). Even 
more simply put, what matters is the harmonizing effect that institutions and governance structures 
may have on transactions, rather than the cost (pecuniary, opportunity or political) of producing a 
good.     
Second, when a strong bilateral interdependence exists between two parties in an incomplete 
contractual relationship, appropriate safeguards (e.g. vertical integration, incentive alignment 
mechanisms, arbitration mechanisms, or reciprocities) enable the parties (or at least one of them) to 
protect their specific investments against the potential hold-up that the other’s opportunistic behavior 
could generate.  
And third, the central prediction of TCE is that: 
 as market transactions become characterized by increasing levels of contractual incompleteness, 
inter-dependence, and quasi-rents, the likelihood of integration should increase. (…) In a typical 
study, some measure of lock-in, such as the specificity of the product procured or investments 
made, is related to the choice of whether to integrate. The strong association that this literature 
has found between specificity and integration has made TCE one of the great success stories in 
industrial organization over the last 25 years. (Whinston 2001: 184-85) 
Shortly after being developed, TCE started being criticized from two sides. On the one hand, 
traditionalist antitrust specialists took an ‘anti-bigness’ approach similar to that of Berle and Means 
(1932). They maintained that integration might have some positive efficiency effects, but that 
Williamson had greatly exaggerated their magnitude, while minimizing the magnitude of their 
negative effects (e.g. Pitofsky 1979, Turner, quoted in Williamson 1985: 19). Williamson refers to this 
line of criticism as the ‘monopoly branch of contract’ (1985: 23-6). On the other hand, some 
economists took a sympathetic but critical view of TCE, arguing that it could perhaps explain the 
importance of TCs in market settings, but could definitely not explain (a) how integration could 
change the scope for opportunism, and therefore (b) how integration was more economizing than the 
market (Grossman and Hart 1986). It is to this second criticism of TCE, branded ‘property rights 
theory’ or ‘incomplete contract theory’, that I now turn.       
Note preliminarily that Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, which is probably the best political-
scientific work using these economic theories to explain delegation) refer to both TCE and the 
‘property rights paradigm’ (p. 42). In the context of describing and explaining the importance of 
controlling the physical assets involved in production for the purposes of avoiding hold-ups, they 
write:  
The more usual solution to the hold-up problem is for the upstream and downstream firms simply 
to merge … The advantage of this hierarchically structured firm is that one person controls all 
physical assets of both companies, and she can then engage in relationship-specific investments 
that would not otherwise be made for fear of the hold-up problem. … The importance of 
controlling the physical assets involved in production is the keystone of the property rights 
approach to vertical integration. (note 7: In fact, this is the principal advantage of the property 
rights paradigm, as traditional transaction cost approaches have difficulty explaining exactly why 
mergers can solve the hold-up problem.. (at 49)    
What is puzzling in this quote is that Epstein and O’Halloran introduce the property rights 
paradigm in their ‘transaction cost politics approach to policy making’ (the title of their book). I show 
here that this is theoretically impossible, because these two theories rely on different assumptions. In 
particular, the property rights paradigm to which Epstein and O’Halloran refer works under the 
explicit assumptions that (a) there are no ex post TCs, (b) there are only limited instances of 
uncertainty, (c) there are no information asymmetries, (d) contractual incompleteness stems mainly 
from limitations of the judicial system, and (e) limitations notwithstanding, the court system is an Yannis Karagiannis 
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efficient dispute resolution mechanism. These assumptions, as we just saw, are not compatible with a 
TCE framework.
30 
Grossman and Hart (1986 – the two leading exponents of the property rights approach to which 
Epstein and O’Halloran refer) started by expressing their sympathetic view on TCE, and by 
acknowledging the presence of ex ante TCs and incomplete contracts (by the same token, they 
differentiated themselves from the mainstream of PA theory, which did not envisage this possibility). 
They also differentiated themselves from PTA, defining the firm as being composed of its assets, 
rather than as a nexus of contracts between voluntarily participating individuals.
31 On this basis, 
Grossman and Hart argued that (a) Williamson had exaggerated the benefits of integration by 
assuming that integration automatically turns a hostile supplier into a docile employee, (b) TCE did 
not make any distinction between the activities carried out via contract between separate owners and 
the activities carried out in a single ownership unit, and thus did not provide an answer to the question 
of the boundaries of the firm, and (c) TCE was unable to distinguish in terms of ‘integration’ between 
in-house employees and exclusive agents. Evidently, this criticism revolves around the issue of 
forbearance. (And, to the extent that forbearance has not yet been convincingly demonstrated in public 
policy environments, Grossman and Hart point to a crucial issue facing political scientists.)     
Grossman and Hart relied on the concepts developed in the property rights literature (e.g. Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972). They thus distinguished between the situation where a contractor uses the 
production facilities that the firm provides to him, and the situation where the contractor uses his own 
production facilities. ‘If the firm owned [all the] important assets of the independent agents, then we 
would say that such a company had the same degree of integration as a company in which the retail 
sales force was composed of ‘employees’.’ (at 694)[
32] On this basis, they made the following five 
assumptions: 
1)  There is, ex ante, a competitive market in identical potential trading partners. This market 
determines the ex ante division of surplus between the principal and the agent. Optimization 
involves maximizing the principal’s benefit subject to the agent’s participation constraint 
(unlike in PA models, there is neither uncertainty nor asymmetric information, and thus no 
incentive compatibility constraint);     
2)  The payment method used by the principal to compensate the agent (whether he is an employee 
or an independent contractor) is some function of the observable states of the nature and the 
observable performance of the parties to the contract; 
3)  Contracts are incomplete in the sense that (a) ex post residual rights, (b) ex ante investments, 
and (c) ex post benefits to the respective parties, cannot be totally foreseen, specified and 
contracted ex ante. This is because (a) depends, by definition, on the realization of the state of 
nature, because (b) are either too complex to be described, or not verifiable by a court of 
justice, and because (c) depends both on the realization of the state of nature and on 
nonverifiable actions, such as effort. (Note that incompleteness means that some assets are not 
contracted upon, and hence that their owners retain full control over them); 
                                                      
30  Both Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995), and Williamson (1985) have repeatedly emphasized these differences. 
Epstein and O’Halloran refer to all these authors, but do not seem to have paid particular attention to their comments on 
this issue.   
31  In addition, Grossman and Hart noted that ‘control or ownership is never absolute. For example, a firm that owns a 
machine may not be able to sell it without the permission of the lenders for which the machine serves as collateral.’ (at 
694) They thus recognized that, in spite of ownership giving full rights, ownership itself may be diluted.   
32  This important point can serve to clarify the difference between the concepts of integration and delegation. Integration 
means acquisition of property rights over assets, while delegation relates to contractual compensation. Delegation occurs 
independently of integration.     Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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4)  Integration in itself does not make any new variable observable to both parties
33; and 
5)  Integration in itself (a) does not change the cost of writing down contracts, and hence cannot be 
associated with complete contracting; but (b) does change who has control over those 
provisions not included in the contract. 
Grossman and Hart proceeded by building a two-periods model which applied equally to vertical 
and horizontal relationships. In the ex ante period, both firms make relationship-specific investments; 
in the ex post period, some further (partly unforeseeable, unforeseen and thus non-contractible) 
production decisions are taken and the benefits from the relationship are realized. The incompleteness 
of the contract regarding (some) ex post decisions and benefits makes it necessary to allocate residual 
rights of control ex ante.  
In the ex post period, the state of the world is revealed, whatever information asymmetries existed 
disappear, further decisions are taken
34, and the parties can renegotiate and recontract on further 
actions and residual rights of control. [Such renegotiations and recontracting are assumed to be 
costless; ex post costlessness is justified by the fact that the state of nature is now realized, and hence 
by the fact that (a) both parties now know what they need, and (b) they now know what they need 
equally well.] This possibility amounts to ex post efficient allocation, and renders the initial allocation 
of property rights ex post irrelevant. Crucially, however, the distribution of the ex post surplus (as 
opposed to its amount) is not insensitive to property rights: if the agent owns his production facilities, 
he may refuse to continue the relationship unless he extracts more surplus – or he may be prepared to 
give up his right for a side payment as part of a renegotiation. In turn, this will affect ex ante 
investment decisions on non-contractible assets.  
Finally, assuming that the parties allocate ownership rights in a way that minimizes ex ante 
investment distortions, Grossman and Hart argued that the usual argument that integration can only 
expand the feasible set fails: integration distorts the incentives of the principal, and (given the 
unspecified nature of his residual rights) he cannot commit to intervene only selectively in the agent’s 
operations. Hence, integration leads to overinvestment by the integrating firm, and underinvestment by 
the integrated one; it therefore imposes costs as well as benefits. The only solution is not 
Williamsonian integration, but a clearer specification of property rights. Phrased as a hypothesis, 
Grossman and Hart argued that residual rights of control over assets (or actions) determine who own 
which assets (or actions). 
CONCLUSION 
This a detailed presentation of four economic approaches to organization (PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT) 
demonstrates that, in spite of some common concerns, these economic theories are neither substitutes 
nor complements. The fact that these theories are used to frame different research questions does not 
mean that they can be used sequentially in a Cartesian deconstruction, nor that elements of one can be 
introduced in an ad hoc fashion in an analysis based on another one. In fact, each theory builds on a 
different set of assumptions that differ from those of the other theories. Economists such as Arrow, 
                                                      
33  This was a direct criticism of Arrow (1975), who had argued that vertical integration economizes on communication 
costs, but who had not explained why (he had not explained why the incentives facing opportunistic agents change with 
integration). As mentioned several times in the text, it also affected TCE and its assumption of forbearance. 
34  For our purposes, it is necessary to note that each party takes such further decisions as a unitary actor: the choice of such 
decisions is (from an organizational point of view) unproblematic, because any subordinate can take it. In Grossman and 
Hart’s words, ‘no special skills are required … [S]ince there are many subordinates available, none is in a position to 
refuse to carry out the owner’s wishes or to argue about terms.’ (at 699) Note two things here: (1) This leaves the 
question of the existence of the firm unanswered (if no special skills are required, the corresponding decision could be 
sub-contracted externally without risk); and (2) This competition among subordinates is not necessarily found in all 
political settings.  Yannis Karagiannis 
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Fama, Grossman, Hart, Jensen, Laffont, Martimort, Tirole and Williamson have been particularly 
attentive to these points, and there are no obvious reasons why political scientists should not take 
example.  
The upshot is that a complete and consistent theory cannot be based on more than one of these 
theories. An actor can be assumed to be either rational or irrational, but not both at the same time. 
(Similarly, most political scientists would want to assume that all actors are either rational, or that all 
are boundedly rational.) The same holds for transaction costs (they can be assumed to be relevant or 
irrelevant), the existence or absence of competition in factor markets, the completeness or 
incompleteness of contracts, etc.    
A strong personal experience can be reported to illustrate the point. Having finished the review that 
you just read, I asked ‘X’ (an eminent empirically-oriented political scientist who specializes in issues 
of delegation and control) to comment on the main parts of this paper. As X himself confessed, he 
thought this paper was counter-productive. Specifically, his comment was that there already exists a 
significant body of political-scientific literature, which proves that excellent empirical work can be 
done without even noting all these (‘uncertain’, I think his word was) complications. But this confirms 
one of my two main points! Much of what X read was indeed very far away from his current research-
design political-scientific interests. X was right, but only in the (unacknowledged by him) sense that 
much of PA, PTA, TCE, and ICT has (almost) nothing to do with the existing framing of delegation 
and control issues.  
Now consider what happened in the end. X stopped reading this paper, apologized for so doing, 
and went back to his own work. In that work (on which I was kindly asked to comment), X continued 
to make plenty of references to ‘principals’, ‘agents’, ‘principal-agent’, ‘delegation to international 
organizations’, ‘transaction costs’, ‘runaway agents’, Coase, Williamson, Epstein and O’Halloran, etc. 
This confirms my second main point! Because of various resource constraints and informational 
asymmetries, the dynamics of the political-scientific ‘Lemon market’ win over those of the ‘Cherry 
market’: the necessary exchange between good economists and good political scientists never actually 
occurs. (I also think that X forgot to mention in his text that he was not referring to Williamson, but to 
what he has heard about him. This rather cynical view of mine is consistent with most of the theories 
examined here.)     
Of course, politics differs from economics, both in substance, and in theories and methods. It is 
therefore necessary to accept the fact that inter-disciplinarity should not come at the expense of some 
amount of pluralism. In addition, confusing as they are, the works of eminent scholars such as Epstein 
and O’Halloran, Franchino, Majone, Moe, etc, have done a great deal in terms of empirical 
knowledge, theoretical sophistication and methodological explication. Nevertheless, political science 
as a discipline still lags behind economics. This may be due to several factors, including ones that we 
may never be able to act upon. But it may also be due to the fact that we have not paid enough 
attention to the theoretical equivalents of our methodological rules for validity and reliability, namely 
(a) logical completeness, (b) internal consistency, and (c) relevance. In the more limited context of 
rational choice approaches to the issues of delegation of powers and subsequent relationships, we have 
not yet distinguished carefully between the different elements of the theories that we apply.       
The box below is aimed at summarizing the main characteristics of the economic theories of PA, 
positive agency and TC, and at highlighting their important differences. (I do not include ICT because 
there is no identifiable political-scientific literature that claims to be based on that theory.) A 
companion paper entitles ´Economic Theories and the Science of inter-Branch Relations´ makes more 
inroads into (a) the specific ways these theories have been used (and often abused) by political 
scientists; (b) the necessity to turn our attention to more theory and – if operating with limited 
resources – less methodology; (c) the trade-offs involved in choosing one among these four economic 
theories; and (d) the relative appeal of opting for a TCE approach – which does not mean that there are 
no opportunity costs in so choosing.     Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies 
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Box 2: A synthetic comparison of the main characteristics of the economic theories of PA, 
positive agency, and transaction costs. 
  PA  Positive agency  Transaction costs 
Intellectual origins  Arrow  Berle & Means  Coase, Berle & Means, 
Simon 
Research question  Optimal contract  Agency costs and 
risk-sharing 
Institutions of governance 
Unit of analysis  The contract  The agent  The transaction 
Temporal focus  Ex ante  Ex ante   Ex ante and ex post 
Behavioral 
assumptions 




Bounded rationality and 
Opportunism 
Contracts  Complete but 





Incomplete with constant 
renegotiations and 
bargaining 




Problem   Asymmetric 
information; 
optimization under rent-
efficiency trade-off   
Asymmetric & 
complex information, 
definition of rights 
and agency costs 




No disputes  Disputes and efficient 
court system 
Disputes and costly court 
system; need for 
governance structures 
First best  Unattainable due to the 
rent-efficiency trade-off 
Unattainable due to 
agency costs 
Unattainable due to 
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